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Abstract
In this paper I propose Bayesian estimation of a nonlinear panel data model with
a fractional dependent variable (bounded between 0 and 1). Specically, I estimate
a panel data fractional probit model which takes into account the bounded nature
of the fractional response variable. I outline estimation under the assumption of
strict exogeneity as well as when allowing for potential endogeneity. Furthermore, I
illustrate how transitioning from the strictly exogenous case to the case of endogeneity
only requires slight adjustments. For comparative purposes I also estimate linear
specications of these models and show how quantities of interest such as marginal
e¤ects can be calculated and compared across models. Using data from the state of
Florida, I examine the relationship between school spending and student achievement,
and nd that increased spending has a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect on
student achievement. Furthermore, this e¤ect is roughly 50% larger in the model
which allows for endogenous spending. Specically, a $1,000 increase in per-pupil
spending is associated with an increase in standardized test pass rates ranging from
6.2-10.1%.
v
1 Introduction
This paper proposes Bayesian estimation of a panel data model with a fractional
dependent variable (bounded between zero and one) and an endogenous explanatory
variable. The model is used to analyze the relationship between public school spending
and student achievement among Florida elementary schools from 1999 through 2005.
Due to a wave of education reforms implemented in the late-90s such as the A-plus
Plan for Education (A+ plan) and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), school
spending may be determined in part by student achievement, and therefore spending is
modeled as potentially endogenous through the use of simultaneous equation modeling
(SEM) and instrumental variables (IV).
The outcome variable of interest, student achievement, is measured as the propor-
tion of each schools students passing Floridas standardized test, the FCAT (Florida
Comprehensive Assessment Test). Since pass rates are bounded between zero and
one, the model is presented as a nonlinear fractional response model. Tradition-
ally, fractional response data has been handled using a linear probability model or
a log-odds transformation, however, these specications both have limitations. The
log-odds model cannot handle y values equal to zero or one without the use of ad-
ditional adjustments, and parameters of primary interest such as partial or marginal
e¤ects can be di¢ cult to interpret (Wooldridge, 2002). While the linear probability
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model assumes constant marginal e¤ects, such that a one unit change in spending
will always change pass rates by the same amount regardless of the initial level of
school spending. If taken literally, this can lead to predicted pass rates of less than
0% or greater than 100%, which would not make sense. Furthermore, it seems more
realistic to assume that, if spending has an e¤ect on student achievement, this e¤ect
would likely diminish as spending increases. These limitations can be overcome by
specifying a nonlinear fractional response model which will bound the relationship
between spending and student achievement to the (0; 1) interval and allow for dimin-
ishing marginal returns (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, 2008). When working with
panel data however, additional complexities arise due to the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity.
Empirically, unobserved heterogeneity can be incorporated through a series of
indicator variables (FE, xed e¤ects estimator) or as random variables xed at the
school level (RE, random e¤ects estimator). However, consistency of the RE estimator
hinges on a strong assumption of independence between the random e¤ects and the
covariates, which is often unrealistic, whereas nonlinear FE models generally su¤er
from an incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2000).1
Therefore, to control for unobserved heterogeneity in nonlinear models, a standard
approach is to either place restrictions on the distribution of the unobserved e¤ects
or rely on a semiparametric approach. The main advantage of a semiparametric
approach is that, by design, no restrictions need to be placed on the distribution of
1One special circumstance is the conditional logit model (also known as xed e¤ects logit), in
which the unobserved e¤ects can be eliminated through the use of a conditional density. However,
this procedure is not applicable when the outcome variable is fractional (Wooldridge, 2002).
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the unobserved e¤ects. However, a major limitation is that quantities of interest such
as marginal e¤ects and average partial e¤ects generally cannot be identied.
As an alternative, I employ a correlated random e¤ects approach (Mundlak, 1978;
Chamberlain, 1982, 1984), in which dependence between the unobserved e¤ects and
explanatory variables is allowed but is restricted through a distributional assumption.
This method is particularly attractive in the nonlinear case because it provides a sim-
ple way of avoiding the incidental parameters problem associated with the FE model
while avoiding the strong assumption of independence in the RE model. Further-
more, by making this additional assumption on the unobserved e¤ects, quantities of
interest such as marginal e¤ects can easily be identied (Altonji and Matzkin, 2005;
Wooldridge, 2005).
Using the correlated random e¤ects approach, I consider Bayesian estimation of a
fractional response panel probit model, and provide an extension in order to allow for
an endogenous explanatory variable. For comparative purposes I also estimate a lin-
ear specication with correlated random e¤ects.2 From a frequentists standpoint, the
fractional response panel probit model was rst introduced by Papke and Wooldridge
(2008), who use the model to estimate the relationship between school spending and
student achievement among Michigan elementary schools. Papke and Wooldridge
initially assume that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, and estimate
the model parameters using a generalized estimating equation(GEE) (Liang and
Zeger, 1986)3 with the mean and variance of the fractional response variable and a
2In the linear case I consider the correlated random e¤ects estimator instead of xed e¤ects be-
cause the linear xed e¤ects model cannot identify covariates which are time-invariant, and variables
with little time-variation, while identiable, are often estimated imprecisely.
3GEE is similar to, and asymptotically equivalent to weighted multivariate nonlinear least squares
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working correlation matrixfor GEE estimation. This approach does not rely on the
joint likelihood distribution of the fractional response, which can be computationally
burdensome to evaluate using frequentist methods. Once endogeneity is introduced,
however, the GEE estimation method used by Papke andWooldridge is no longer con-
sistent. Therefore, as an alternative, they estimate a less-e¢ cient two-step pooled
fractional probit quasi maximum likelihood estimation(QMLE) method,4 and after-
wards they must employ simulation methods (bootstrapping in particular) in order
to obtain asymptotic standard errors, adjusted for their two-stage approach.
In recent years the fractional probit model with endogeneity has been applied in
a variety of panel data settings. A few examples include Hanna (2010) who exam-
ined whether multinational rms increased production overseas in response to heavier
environmental regulations imposed domestically. Nguyen (2010), who analyzed the
e¤ect of fertility on the female labor supply as measured by the fraction of hours
worked per week. Gardeazabal (2010), who examined the e¤ect of economic uctu-
ations on political party vote shares in Spanish general elections, and, McCabe and
Snyder (2011) who examined whether online access to academic journals increased
the citation rates of published articles.
In contrast to the Frequentist methods used in the aforementioned articles, my
approach is a likelihood based estimation method which becomes feasible through
(WMNLS). However, in many cases it is not possible to nd the true variance matrix var(yi j
xi);which is needed for WMNLS. Therefore, in the GEE procedure a workingversion of var(yi j xi)
is specied based on distributional assumptions (see Imbens & Wooldridge, 2007; and Papke &
Wooldridge, 2008).
4In step one, Papke andWooldridge use a control function to estimate the equation for endogenous
school spending (the endogenous explanatory variable).Then in step two they obtain the residuals
from the spending equation and plug them into the main outcome equation to estimate the e¤ect of
endogenous school spending on student achievement (using the pooled probit QMLE method).
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the use of a Bayesian data augmentation technique. This allows me to work di-
rectly with the joint likelihood distribution of the fractional response, and create a
fully e¢ cient estimation method in which all parameters and standard errors can be
estimated simultaneously through the use of Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) simulation methods. Using this approach, likelihood based estimation can
be performed in the case of strict exogeneity as well as in the case of an endogenous
explanatory variable, and transitioning from one model to the other only requires
slight adjustments, which are rather straightforward. Conversely, in the Frequentist
framework, this transition from a strictly exogenous model to one which allows for
endogeneity requires a more drastic change in estimation methods, which nevertheless
remains ine¢ cient.
A secondary motivation for the Bayesian approach proposed here is from a pol-
icy perspective, as quantities of interest such as marginal e¤ects can be calculated
directly and can also be interpreted as probabilities, whereas those calculated in the
frequentists framework can only be identied up to a scale factor (see Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2007; Papke and Wooldridge, 2008).
The analysis is related to several previous Bayesian contributions, including Al-
bert and Chib (1993), Li (1998), Chib and Carlin (1999), and Bacolod and Tobias
(2006). Albert and Chib (1993) introduce a Bayesian treatment of the discrete binary
response model using the data augmentation method. Then Li (1998) uses this data
augmentation technique to estimate a simultaneous equation model with a limited
dependent variable and an endogenous explanatory variable. Chib and Carlin (1999)
extend these methods to the longitudinal setting with the panel probit MCMC algo-
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rithm, and nally, Bacolod and Tobias (2006) employ Bayesian panel data methods
in order to analyze the relationship between school inputs and student achievement.
In this paper I provide further extensions to the panel probit model in order to allow
for a fractional outcome variable as well as a continuous endogenous covariate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section I dene
the fractional response panel probit model under strict exogeneity, which I refer to as
the baseline model. A Bayesian estimation method is then presented using MCMC
simulation methods, and the calculation of marginal e¤ects is addressed. In Section
3 a respecication of the model is proposed in order to allow for an endogenous ex-
planatory variable, in which identication of the structural parameters of interest is
performed through the use of an instrumental variables (IV) technique and simulta-
neous equation modeling (SEM). In Section 4 the proposed algorithms are used to
analyze the relationship between school spending and student achievement among
Florida elementary schools. In Section 5 I outline specication tests which can be
implemented using Bayes factors as the criteria for model comparison. Finally, in
Section 6 I conclude with a summary and brief discussion.
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2 Model specication under strict exogeneity (base-
line model)
Unlike in the case of the frequentist approach, introduction of endogeneity in the
Bayesian approach leads to an estimation method which is just a slight modication
of that for the strictly exogenous model. To simplify the exposition of the model,
and estimation, I start with the baseline model under strict exogeneity. Assuming a
probit specication, I express the conditional mean of the fractional response as
E(yitjxit;gi; ci) =  (ci + xit + gi) ; (1)
where there are N independent institutions observed over T periods, such that i and t
index institutions and time respectively, and the sample consists of NT observations;
() represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function; yit is an out-
come variable, 0  yit  1; ci represents time-constant unobserved di¤erence across
institutions; xit denotes a 1  k vector of explanatory variables which vary across
institutions and time; and gi denotes a 1 h vector of time-invariant regressors.5
Following Chamberlain (1982, 1984), I formalize a relationship between the indi-
5The probit function, (); is specied because we will be making use of the normal distribution
to allow for correlation between ci and xit in (1). Therefore, specifying a probit function which
also makes use of the normal distribution is a convenient choice. Alternatively, one could choose to
specify the logistic function (), however, computationally this would be more demanding.
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vidual e¤ects and time-varying explanatory variables such that ci is a function of all
lagged, present, and future values of xit:
ci =  + xi11 + xi22 + :::+ xiTT + ai;
ai j xi1; :::;xiT  N(0; 2a); (2)
where  is an intercept term, 1; :::;T are k  1 parameter vectors, and ai is a
normally distributed error term with zero mean and conditional variance 2a.
Combining equations (1) and (2) yields
E(yitjxit;gi; ai) =  ( + xi+ xit + gi+ ai) ; (3)
where xi = [xi1; :::;xiT ]; and  = [1; :::;T ]:
To simplify the notation I denote Wit = [1;xi;xit;gi] as a vector of all observable
data, 
 = [ ;;;] as a parameter vector, and T as a T -vector of ones. Then for
institution i at all time periods (3) can be written as
E(yi jWi; ai) =  (Wi
 + Tai) : (4)
The model above is specied in a semiparametric way such that the conditional mean
of yit is dened, but the distribution of yit is not. However, in this Bayesian approach
a set of augmented data is introduced in the parameter set which makes it possible to
obtain fully e¢ cient likelihood based estimates for the parameters in (3), even though
the distribution of yit is not explicitly specied.
8
The augmented data is created by introducing a dummy vector dit (S  1) for
each observation in the sample. These dummy vectors are constructed such that
each element, dits (s = 1; :::; S) ; takes a value of either one or zero such that the
proportion of ones in dit is equal to the outcome variable, yit (the proportion of
students passing the FCAT exam at school i time t): In the application section that
follows all FCAT scores were rounded to the nearest hundredth by the FLDOE,
therefore, in such a construction S = 100:6 Thus, vector dit is treated as fully observed
for each observation, and by construction each dit vector consists of ones and zeros
such that the rst 100yit elements are ones and the following 100(1 yit) elements
are zeros.
The dummy vector dit is dened by S latent random normal variables:
yits = Wit
 + ai + uits; (5)
uits  N(0; 1);
such that
dits = 1; if yits = Wit
 + ai + uits > 0;
dits = 0; if yits = Wit
+ai + uits  0:
This process denes the random variable dits; for which the likelihood function can
6As an example, if yit = 0:73; indicating that 73% of the students in school i time t passed the
FCAT exam, then the rst 73 (s = 1; :::; 73) elements of dit will be equal to one and the remaining
27 (s = 74; :::; 100) elements will be equal to zero.
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be written as
(Wit
 + ai)
dits [1  (Wit
 + ai)]1 dits ;
such that
E (ditsjWit; ai) =  (Wit
 + ai) :
The joint likelihood for the entire dit is
(Wit
 + ai)
PS
s=1
dits [1  (Wit
 + ai)]
PS
s=1
(1 dits) : (6)
This likelihood will produce the same point estimates as the more familiar probit
likelihood function:
(Wit
 + ai)
yit [1  (Wit
 + ai)](1 yit) ;
since it is a monotonic retransformation of (6) : Specically, raising (6) to the power
of
1
S
results in the probit likelihood function but with fractional response variable
yit; 0  yit  1; rather than a binary outcome. Thus, this allows me to specify a
fully parametric model with data augmentation in which the moment condition, (4),
is satised since by construction
yit =
1
S
SX
s=1
dits:
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Using the data augmentation technique, I include the augmented data, yits; directly
into the likelihood function (Tanner and Wong, 1987; Albert and Chib, 1993), and
the augmented data density for observation i; t can be written as
p(dit; y

it j 
;ai;Wit) =
1p
2
exp
 
 :5
SX
s=1

(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai)
!
SX
s=1
[I(dits = 1)I(y

its > 0) + I(dits = 0)I(y

its  0)] ; (7)
where I is simply an indicator function which takes the value 1 if the statement in
the parenthesis is true and 0 otherwise.
2.1 Prior distributions
In Bayesian statistics, inference is made based upon a posterior distribution formed by
combining information provided by data and prior knowledge about the parameters of
interest. The data are summarized in terms of the likelihood function or data density,
while the prior, which can be viewed as information provided by specialists or ndings
from previous research is incorporated through a probability density function.
Bayesian estimation follows by rst assigning prior distributions to all parameters
in the model. However, in many instances there is no reliable prior information
available. In this case one can proceed by using at or di¤use priors so that,
relative to the likelihood function, the prior contributes very little information to the
posterior. This enables the posterior distribution to be dominated by the data (i.e.
11
likelihood function), which Gelman et al. (1995) explain allows the data to speak for
itself.7
The parameters  ;;; and  are all assigned commonly used conjugate-normal
priors:
  N( ;H 1 );   N(;H 1 );   N(;H 1 );   N(;H 1 );
which are centered at zero mean and made di¤use by choosing a large variance equal
to 10. Following Chib and Carlin (1999), these parameters are then drawn together
in one block as

 = [ ;;;]  N(
;H
):
where the variance term, H
 = 10I1+Tk+k+h: The second stage variance parameter is
also assigned a commonly used conjugate-inverse gamma prior:
2a  IG(aa; ba);
where the hyperparameters aa and 1=ba represent the shape and scale parameters:8
In hierarchical models care must be taken in choosing values for the hyperparame-
7Gelman et al. (2004) also note that when using a di¤use prior, the mean of the posterior
distribution will be a weighted average of the prior mean values and the standard maximum likelihood
estimates.
8Such that the mean equals 1=baaa 1 and variance is
1=b2a
(aa 1)2(aa 2) :
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ters, as noninformative second stage priors can lead to improper posteriors (Carlin,
1996; Hobert and Casella, 1996). Furthermore, Chib and Carlin (1999) show that
if the variance prior is overly vaguethe Markov chain will likely su¤er from slow
convergence. To avoid this, the hyperparameters are set to aa = 3 and ba = 0:025,
so that the mean and standard deviation are both equal to 20, a proper, but rather
vague prior specication (see Koop, Poirier, and Tobias, 2007).
2.2 Sampling from the posterior and estimation of marginal
e¤ects
Let  equal a vector of all parameters in the model such that  = (
; ai; 2a): Then
the augmented joint posterior density, which is proportional to the product of the
augmented data density (7) and the prior distributions of the parameters 
; ai; and
2a can be written as
p(;y j y;W) _
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp
"
 :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai)
#

NY
i=1
TY
t=1
"
SX
s=1
[I(dits = 1)I(y

its > 0) + I(dits = 0)I(y

its  0)]
#

(2) (1+Tk+k+h)=2 jH
j1=2 exp [ :5(
 
)0H
(
 
)]
NY
i=1
1p
2a
exp
  :5a0i 2a ai 1 (aa)baaa (2a) (aa+1) exp

  1
ba2a

: (8)
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The model parameters can then be estimated via Gibbs sampling (Geman and Geman,
1984). The basic idea behind the Gibbs sampler is to partition the joint posterior into
smaller blocks known as full conditional posterior densities. If analytically tractable,
these full conditional densities can then be drawn from directly, from which successive
and repeated draws will create an ergodic Markov chain a sequence of draws which
eventually converges to some target density.9 After a number of iterations, this joint
sequence will converge to the joint posterior of interest (8). Functions of the poste-
rior such as the mean and variance can then be estimated based on the simulated
draws, and will satisfy a central-limit theorem as the length of the simulation tends
to innity (Chib and Greenberg, 1996; Gamerman and Lopes, 2006). The parameter
estimates are then based on the following full conditional distributions (calculations
are presented in Appendix 1):
1. The conditional posterior kernel for the latent variable yits is normally distributed
as yits j yit;Wit; ai;
; 2a  N [Wit
 + ai; 1]; and is truncated at zero such that
yits > 0 if dits = 1;
yits  0 if dits = 0:
9In terms of Markov Chains, ergocity is equivalent to the strong law of large numbers (Gill, 2002).
It states that if () is the target distribution and i and j are random draws from the chain such
that p(i; j) measures the probability that the chain will move from i to j then lim
n!1p
n(i; j)
= (j):
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2. The full conditional density for ai j yit;Wit; yits;
; 2a is normally distributed as
ai  N
h
ai; H
 1
a
i
; where
Ha = S  T +  2a
ai = H
 1
a
"
TX
t=1
 
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
)
!#
:
3. The full joint conditional density of block 
 =[ ;;;] is normally distributed
as 
 j yit;Wit; yits; ai; 2a  N
h

;H
 1


i
, where
H
 = H
 + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
W0itWit

 = H
 1


"
H

 +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
W0it
 
SX
s=1
(yits   ai)
!#
:
4. Finally, the full conditional density of the variance parameter 2a is inverse gamma,
i.e.
2a j yit;Wit; yits;
; 2a  IG
0@N
2
+ aa;
"
b 1a +
1
2
NX
i=1
a0iai
# 11A :
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Steps of the MCMC algorithm are as follows:
Algorithm 1
1. Sample y(1)its from p(y

its j yit;Wit; a(0)i ;
(0); 2(0)a )
2. Sample a(1)i from p(ai j yit;Wit; y(1)its ;
(0); 2(0)a )
3. Sample 
(1) from p(
 j yit;Wit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ; 2(0)a )
where 
(1) = [ (1);(1);(1);(1)]
4. Sample 2
(1)
a from p(
2
a j yit;Wit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ;
(1))
5. Repeat steps 1-4 R times and at each step update the conditioning variables with
their most recent values.
The Gibbs sampling process begins by assigning initial values to the parameters of
interest (a(0)i ;

(0); 2
(0)
a ); where the superscripts represent the current iteration step.
These initial values can be drawn from their corresponding prior distributions. Each
parameter is then sampled successively from their respective conditional distributions,
and at each step the parameter values are updated. The rst iteration is completed
after sampling from all four conditional densities. After this process is repeated M
times, convergence to the target distribution will take place and the subsequent R M
draws will come directly from the joint posterior of interest (8).
The model parameters were all assigned conjugate priors to ensure that each full
conditional (steps 1-4) is of known form and can be directly drawn from. For instance
the conditional posterior of 
 will be normally distributed, while the conditional
posterior of 2a will be inverse gamma.
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An added complication of the probit model (along with most nonlinear models) is
that the estimated slope coe¢ cients, 
; do not have a direct interpretation. Rather
they only indicate the sign (positive or negative) and statistical signicance of the
estimated e¤ect. To estimate the magnitude one must obtain the marginal e¤ects,
which for a continuous explanatory variable, 
j, can be calculated as
@E(yit jWit;ai)
@Wj
= 
j(Wit
 + ai); (9)
where  is the standard normal probability density function (pdf). Equation (9) shows
that the marginal e¤ects depend on the data, Wit; and on the random component, ai:
In the classical framework, estimating (9) is not particularly straightforward because
the error term, ai; is not observed. As a solution, Papke and Wooldridge (2008) have
outlined a procedure in which they eliminate ai from (9) by dividing the remaining
observed parameters ( ;;;) by a scale factorof (1 + 2a)
1=2: They then obtain
scaled versions of the average partial e¤ects10 of 
j by di¤erentiating the adjusted
equation with respect to Wj and plugging in values for Wit such as its average over
T or over N and T:
Conversely, with the Bayesian methods proposed here, I not only obtain posterior
means for all parameters in (9) (including ai), but through Gibbs sampling I can
also obtain the entire distribution of each parameter. Therefore, the whole posterior
10Marginal e¤ects with ai integrated or averagedout.
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distribution of the marginal e¤ect is available as
@E(yit jWit; ai)
@Wj
= b
(r)j (Wit b
(r) + ba(r)i ); (10)
where the superscript r denotes the rth draw of the Gibbs sampler. The marginal
e¤ects can then be calculated by simply plugging in interesting values of Wit such as
minimum or maximum values, or by averagingW over N and T . The posterior mean
of the marginal e¤ect can then be calculated by averaging (10) over MCMC draws:
R 1
RX
r=1
b
(r)j (Wit b
(r) + ba(r)i ): (11)
Straightforward calculations of the posterior standard deviations and highest posterior
density intervals (HPDIs) are available as well.
2.3 Linear model with correlated random e¤ects
MCMC estimation of the linear model will be very similar to the probit model outlined
above, with a few minor adjustments. Introduction of the latent variable, yits; is no
longer required so the full conditionals will be based on the actual joint posterior
density with likelihood function:
p(yit j 
;ai; 2a; 2u;Wit) =
1p
2u
exp
 :5 (yit  Wit
  ai)0  2u (yit  Wit
  ai) ; (12)
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rather than the augmented posterior (8). Therefore the full conditionals will contain
the actual data yit rather than yits: Furthermore, identication of the linear model
does not require any restrictions being placed on the variance parameter, 2u; (in
the probit model I must assume that 2u = 1 for identication). Consequently an
additional inverse-gamma prior for 2u will be introduced, and an MCMC step will be
added to the algorithm in order to estimate 2u: Details for the baseline linear MCMC
are provided in Appendix 2.
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3 Model specication with an endogenous explana-
tory variable (IV model)
In this section an extension to the baseline model is proposed in order to allow for
potential endogeneity of a continuous explanatory variable, denoted qit. To account
for qit; equation (5) can be rewritten as
yits = qit +  + xi+ xit + gi;11 + ai + uits; (13)
where all I have done in (13) is added qit to the right hand side.11 The potentially
endogenous explanatory variable, qit; can then be estimated through an instrumental
variables regression (of linear form):
qit =  i + zit + gi;22 + "it; (14)
where  i represents the time-constant unobserved e¤ects; zit is a 1  L vector of
time-varying instruments, including xit and a set of m exclusion restrictions which
enter (14) only; gi2 represents a vector of time-invariant instruments, including gi1
and any time-invariant exclusion restrictions; and "it is an idiosyncratic error term.
11In the baseline model, variable qit would have been blocked together with the other explanatory
variables in either xit or gi:
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In practice, proper exclusion restrictions may or may not be available as they must
be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable qit, but unrelated to the
unobservables "it and uits: However, in the theoretical section that follows I assume
that valid exclusion restrictions are available in (14).
The unobserved e¤ects,  i; are dened (using Chamberlains correlated random
e¤ects assumption) as a linear function of all time-varying explanatory variables in
all time periods:
 i =  + zi11 + zi22 + :::+ ziTT + bi
bi j zi1; :::; ziT  N(0; 2b); (15)
where  is an intercept term, and 1; :::; T are L  1 parameter vectors. Plugging
this auxiliary equation into (14):
qit =  + zi+ zit + gi;22 + bi + "it; (16)
where  = [1; :::;T ]:
The nature of endogeneity in qit is accounted for through the relationship between
the idiosyncratic error terms uits and "it; which for individual i at time t; I assume is
constant across the augmented data, s: Following the usual treatment of Bayesian IV
models, the error terms are assumed a joint distribution which is bivariate normal with
zero mean and variance-covariance matrix  (see Geweke, 1996; Chao and Phillips,
1998; Kleibergen and van Dijk, 1998; Kleibergen and Zivot, 2003; Hoogerheide et al.,
21
2007) where
 = var
0BB@ uits
"it
1CCA =
0BB@ 2u u"
u" 
2
"
1CCA ;
where var(uits) = 2u; var("it) = 
2
" and cov(uits; "it) = u":
To simplify notation I denoteWit = [qit; 1;xi;xit;gi1] as a matrix of all observable
data in equation (13) and 
 =[;  ;;;1] as the vector of all parameters: Similarly
Qit = [1; zi; zit;gi2] represents a matrix of observable data in equation (15) and  as
the vector of parameters [;;;2]. The model can then be written as a system of
equations such that
yits = Wit
 + ai + uits;
qit = Qit + bi + "it: (17)
Given the formulation above, the augmented joint likelihood function is commonly
expressed as the joint bivariate normal distribution of (uits; "it). However, for com-
putational convenience the augmented likelihood function can also be written as the
product of the conditional distribution of uits given "it and the marginal distribution of
"it (Li, 1998). This allows us to write the augmented data density in a one-dimensional
form using partitioned elements of: Let = [
;ai; 2a; 
2
u; u";Wit;; bi; 
2
b ; 
2
";Qit];
then, the augmented data density for observation i; t can be written as
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p(dit; y

it; qit j ) =
1p
2u
exp
 
 :5
SX
s=1

(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0 1u (yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)
! 
SX
s=1
[I(dits = 1)I(y

its > 0) + I (dits = 0) I (y

its  0)]
!

1p
2"
exp
 :5(qit  Qit  bi)0 1" (qit  Qit  bi) ; (18)
where
u = 
2
u  
2u"
2"
; " = 
2
"; and u" =
u"
2"
; (19)
and
"it = qit  Qit  bi:
The degree of endogeneity between qit and yit is captured through the covariance
parameter u": Identication of the probit model requires restrictions on one of the
variance parameters, therefore u is set to one.
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3.1 Prior distributions
Given specication (18), all parameters can be assigned priors similar to those in
Section 2. The parameter vectors 
 and  are assigned conjugate normal priors:

 =[;  ;;;1]  N(
;H 1
 );  = [;;;2]  N(;H 1 );
and are specied as di¤use, while the second stage variance parameters are assigned
conjugate inverse-gamma priors:
"  IG(a" ; b"); 2a  IG(aa; ba); 2b  IG(ab; bb):
Finally, the covariance parameter (between the errors uits and "it) is assigned a di¤use
normal prior as
u"  N(u"; H 1u");
with u" = 0 and H
 1
u"
= 10:
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3.2 Sampling from the posterior and estimation of marginal
e¤ects
The full augmented posterior density is proportional to the product of the augmented
data density (18) and the prior densities of all parameters. This can be written as
p(y;
;ai; 2a; u";; bi; 
2
b ; " j y;W;q;Q) /
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp[ :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)]
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
 
SX
s=1
[I(dits = 1)I(y

its > 0) + I (dits = 0) I (y

its  0)]
!

NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2"
exp
 :5(qit  Qit  bi)0 1" (qit  Qit  bi)
NY
i=1
1p
2a
exp[ :5a0i 2a ai]
NY
i=1
1p
2b
exp[ :5b0i 2b bi]
(2) 
1+Tk+k+h+1
2 jH
j
1
2 exp[ :5(
 
)0H
(
 
)]
(2) 
1+Tk+L+h
2 jHj
1
2 exp[ :5( )0H( )]
(2) 
1
2
Hu" 12 exp[ :5(u"   u")0Hu"(u"   u")]
1
 (aa)baaa
(2a)
 (aa+1) exp

  1
ba2a

 1
 (ab)b
ab
b
(2b)
 (ab+1) exp

  1
bb2b


1
 (a")b
a"
"
(")
 (a"+1) exp

  1
b""

: (20)
The parameter estimates are then based on the following full conditional distributions
(calculations are presented in Appendix 3):
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1. The conditional posterior kernel of the latent data yits is normally distributed as
yits j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N [Wit
 + ai + u""it; 1], and is
truncated at zero such that
yits > 0 if dits = 1 and
yits  0 if dits = 0:
2. The full conditional density for ai is normally distributed as
ai j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; bi;
;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
ai; H
 1
a
i
where
Ha = S  T +  2a
ai = H
 1
a
"
TX
t=1
 
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  u""it)
!#
:
3. The full conditional of the parameter vector 
 =[;  ;;;1] is normally
distributed as 
 j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h

;H
 1


i
with
H
 = H
 + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
W0itWit

 = H
 1


"
H

 +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1it
W0it
 
SX
s=1
(yits   ai   u""it)
!#
:
4. The posterior distribution of the variance parameter 2a is inverse gamma, i.e.
2a j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2b ; "  IG
24N
2
+ aa;
 
b 1a +
1
2
NX
i=1
a0iai
! 135 :
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5. The conditional distribution of bi is normally distributed as
bi j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai;
;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
bi; H
 1
b
i
where
Hb = T   1" + S  T  2u" +  2b
bi = H
 1
b
"
 1"
TX
t=1
(qit  Qit)  u"
TX
t=1
 
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"(qit  Qit))
!#
:
6. The full conditional of the parameter vector  = [;;;2] is normally
distributed as  j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
;H
 1

i
where
H = H +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
Q0itQit
 1
" + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
Q0itQit
2
u"
 = H
 1

"
H +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
 
 1" Q
0
it(qit   bi)  u"Q0it
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"qit + u"bi)
!#
:
7. The conditional distribution of the covariance parameter u" is normally
distributed as u" j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
u"; H
 1
u"
i
where
Hu" = Hu" + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
"0it"it
u" = H
 1
u"
"
Hu"u" +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
"0it
 
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai)
!#
:
8. The posterior distribution of the variance parameter 2b is inverse gamma, i.e.
2b j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2a; "  IG
24N
2
+ ab;
 
b 1b +
1
2
NX
i=1
b0ibi
! 135 :
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9. Finally, the posterior distribution of the variance parameter " is inverse gamma,
i.e.
" j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2a; 2b 
IG
24NT
2
+ a" ;
 
b 1" +
1
2
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
(qit  Qit  bi)2
! 135 :
Steps of the MCMC algorithm are as follows:
Algorithm 2
1. Sample y(1)its from p(y

its j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; a(0)i ;
(0); 2(0)a ; b(0)i ;(0); (0)u" ; 2(0)b ; (0)" )
2. Sample a(1)i from p(ai j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; y(1)its ;
(0); 2(0)a ; b(0)i ;(0); (0)u" ; 2(0)b ; (0)" )
3. Sample 
(1) from p(
 j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ; 2(0)a ; b(0)i ;(0); (0)u" ; 2(0)b ; (0)" )
where 
(1)=[(1);  (1);(1);(1);(1)1 ]
4. Sample 2
(1)
a from p(
2
a j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ;
(1); b(0)i ;(0); (0)u" ; 2(0)b ; (0)" )
5. Sample b(1)i from p(bi j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ;
(1); 2(1)a ;(0); (0)u" ; 2(0)b ; (0)" )
6. Sample (1) from p( j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ;
(1); 2(1)a ; b(1)i ; (0)u" ; 2(0)b ; (0)" )
where (1)= [(1);(1);(1);(1)2 ]
7. Sample (1)u" from p(u" j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ;
(1); 2(1)a ; b(1)i ;(1); 2(0)b ; (0)" )
8. Sample 2
(1)
b from p(
2
b j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ;
(1); 2(1)a ; b(1)i ;(1); (1)u" ; (0)" )
9. Sample (1)" from p(" j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; y(1)its ; a(1)i ;
(1); 2(1)a ; b(1)i ;(1); (1)u" ; 2(1)b )
10. Repeat steps 1-9 R times and at each step update the conditioning variables with
their most recent values.
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Successive draws from the conditional densities one through nine via Gibbs sam-
pling will create a sequence of draws that will eventually converge to the full posterior
(20).
Given MCMC estimates of (r)" and 
(r)
u" I then obtain estimates of the variance
parameters 2"; 
2
u; and u" by solving the equations:
2(r)" = 
(r)
" ; 
(r)
u" = 
(r)
u"  2(r)" and 2(r)u = 1 +

2(r)
u"

2(r)
"
Where the superscript r indicates that I obtain values for 2u; 
2
"; and u" during each
MCMC draw (r = 1; :::; R).
For a continuous explanatory variable, 
j; straightforward calculations of the
posterior distribution for the marginal e¤ects follow as
b
(r)j (Wit b
(r) + ba(r)i + b(r)u"b"(r)it ): (21)
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4 Application: the e¤ect of school spending on
student achievement
4.1 Literature
Examining the relationship between school spending and student achievement has
been the focus of a large body of work, and much debate, dating back to the Cole-
man Report (Coleman et al. 1966). The Coleman Report gained national attention
primarily because of its ndings that the main determinants of student achievement
were not related to school inputs, but rather the characteristics of the students fam-
ily and friends. In response to these ndings, numerous researchers have attempted
to analyze the relationship between school inputs (including school spending) and
student achievement using the education production function (EPF)  a model
which studies the relationship between inputs into the learning process and some
measure of educational output. Inputs generally include school spending or other
school resources, student and school characteristics, and family background, while
output is measured using some degree of student achievement, typically in the form
of standardized test scores (Hanushek, 2003).
Although a large number of researchers have used the EPF to examine the rela-
tionship between school spending and student achievement, little, if any consensus
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has been reached. In a series of often cited literature reviews, Hanushek (1986, 1996,
and 2003) has summarized the results of hundreds of EPFs studies dating from the
early-1970s to mid-1990s. Using a statistical technique known as vote counting, he
categorized the regression results of each study based on statistical signicance and
direction (positive or negative). In his recent review, Hanushek (2003) showed that
out of 163 EPF studies, 66% found a statistically insignicant relationship between
school spending and student achievement, 27% found a positive (and signicant) re-
lationship, and 7% were negative (and signicant). Based on similar ndings from his
previous reviews, Hanushek (1986) wrote there appears to be no strong or system-
atic relationship between school expenditures and student performance(Hanushek,
p. 1162). This statement has however been challenged by several researchers. In par-
ticular, Hedges et al. (1994) and Greenwald et al. (1996) criticized Hanusheks vote
counting methodology, and reanalyzed the literature through meta-analysis. Both of
these studies found that a strong and positive relationship between school spending
and student achievement did in fact exist.
Other researchers have argued that the mixed conclusions found in the literature
are not due to a lacking relationship between school spending and student achieve-
ment, but are the product of modeling di¤erences and misspecications. In particular,
many of the traditional EPF studies may fail to account for endogeneity, arising be-
cause school spending might be correlated with unobservable determinants of student
achievement (Ferguson & Ladd, 1996; Ludwig & Bassi, 1999; Guryan, 2001; Webbink,
2005). This could occur if relevant explanatory variables, such as family inputs, are
excluded from the model (omitted variables), but are related to both school spending
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and student test scores. For example, if highly motivated parents spend additional
time helping their children with their homework, and also choose to send their children
to schools with more resources, then a researcher who does not observe parental mo-
tivation may nd that school resources have a positive e¤ect on student achievement.
However, in reality the higher achievement is due in part by parental motivation
(Tiebout, 1956; Mayer, 1997; Webbink, 2005). In this case, traditional EPF models
which assume strict exogeneity may overstate the true relationship between school
spending and student achievement. Ludwig and Bassi (1999) explained that if this
were the only reason to expect estimation bias then traditional EPF studies could be
viewed as upper bound estimates.However, there is also a possibility that some
schools are funded in a compensatory manner, whereby lower achieving schools in-
crease spending in an e¤ort to raise the student achievement level. If this is true then
traditional EPF estimates may actually underestimate the true relationship between
school spending and student achievement (Heckman et al., 1996).
In an e¤ort to account for these endogenous changes in school spending numerous
researchers have applied instrumental variable (IV) regression techniques, and have
generally found a larger positive relationship between school spending and student
achievement as compared to the traditional studies which assume strict exogeneity
(see Ferguson and Ladd, 1996; Ludwig & Bassi, 1999; Dewey et al., 2000; Roy,
2003; Levacic et al., 2005; Papke, 2005; Webbink, 2005; Jenkins et al., 2006; Papke
and Wooldridge, 2008). In practice however, nding a proper instrument can be a
challenging task as it must be correlated with school spending but have no relationship
with student achievement otherwise.
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In much of the literature, researchers have tried to solve this problem by creatively
exploiting some change in nature,often brought about by a new government policy
that leads to (arguably) exogenous variations in school resources. For instance, Roy
(2003), Papke (2005), and Papke and Wooldridge (2008) all used longitudinal data
to analyze the relationship between school spending and student achievement among
Michigan elementary schools in the mid 1990s. During this time period a new law
(Proposal A) was passed which changed Michigans school funding scheme to one that
relied more heavily on state funding (through sales tax revenues) and less on local
property taxes. This led to large changes in school spending (see Papke, 2005), which
the researchers assumed was unrelated to student achievement. As another example,
Guryan (2001) took advantage of changes in state funding among Massachusetts
school districts caused by the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993. The
policy was implemented in an e¤ort to equalize spending across Massachusetts school
districts, which Guryan argued led to exogenous changes in district spending levels.
In many instances however, there are school systems of interest but no natural
experiments to exploit. In these cases the issue of endogeneity can still be addressed
if the researcher can locate an external instrument. For example, Dewey et al. (2000)
proposed using political variables such as whether the democratic or republican party
had control of the state government (both legislative and executive). However, this
data will not have much variation as it is can only be measured at the state level, and
therefore can only be used to compare schools across states. As another alternative
Ferguson and Ladd (1996) analyzed district-level data on Alabama schools and used
per-capita income and property values as instruments. However, this instrument
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might not be valid, as previous research has indicated that student achievement may
have a positive impact on housing prices (Hayes & Taylor, 1996; Bogart and Cromwell,
1997; Black, 1999; Weimer and Wolko¤, 2001; Figlio & Lucas, 2004).
4.2 Data summary
The purpose of the empirical work in this section is to further investigate the rela-
tionship between school spending and student achievement by analyzing data on a
large subset of Florida elementary schools, observed over a seven year period. The
paper attempts to address the endogeneity problem in a number of ways. First, data
are collected from a variety of sources in order to control for as many relevant school,
student, and family characteristics as possible. In addition, the panel data methods
outlined in Sections 2 and 3 are applied in order to allow for individual school e¤ects
which control for any time-constant unobserved di¤erence across schools such as (but
not limited to): school administration, school policy di¤erences, school structural dif-
ferences, geographical di¤erences, and other historical di¤erences. Finally, the model
will attempt to identify a causal relationship between school spending and student
achievement through the use of SEM and IV methods in order to capture exogenous
changes in school spending.
The data are comprised of 1138 public elementary schools, located in 28 of the
larger Florida school districts. (For the purposes of this paper a large school district
is dened as one which contains at least 10 elementary schools.) The data set was
constructed using multiple sources. School-level data were collected for a seven year
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period between 1999 and 2005 from the Florida School Indicators Report (FSIR) and
the Common Core of Data (CCD), provided by the Florida Department of Education
and National Center of Education Statistics respectively. The year 1999 refers to the
school year of fall 1998 - spring 1999, and 2005 refers to the school year of fall 2004 -
spring 2005. Additional city-level data were collected for the year 2000 using the U.S.
Census Bureaus database, and district-level data were gathered from the property
valuation and tax data spreadsheets (1999-2005) supplied by the Florida Department
of Revenue.
The FSIR database provided detailed school level information on standardized test
scores as well as school and teacher characteristics. School and teacher characteristics
included variables such as the school size (number of students), teacherseducation,
the proportion of sta¤ devoted to instruction, and school spending per-pupil (which
was converted into 1999 dollars using the Southeast CPI data.) Student composition
measures included variables such as the percentage of students classied into gifted,
special education, and English as a second language (ESOL) programs, as well as
the percentage of students absent for more than 21 days in a school year. The CCD
provided information on each schools racial and ethnic composition and physical
location (city and zip code.) These data were then matched with data from the 2000
Census to derive adult education levels for each neighborhood. Finally, the Florida
Department of Revenue data was used to gather county level property taxes.12
The sample time period is of particular interest because it coincides with the 1999
12In Florida, a school districts boundary is dened by the county boundary. Therefore the terms
school district and county can be used interchangeably.
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implementation of Floridas A-plus Program for Education, a school accountability
reform aimed at increasing student achievement throughout the state. At the center
of the reform was a school grading system used by the state government to rank
each Florida public school on a scale of A through F. Grades were based mainly
on each schools overall student performance on the FCAT exam  a high stakes
standardized test administered annually to Floridas public school students. Schools
that received a D or an F grade were provided with assistance and intervention plans,
which if necessary included access to additional resources and the reassignment or
even replacement of school sta¤ members. For a detailed summary of assistance
plans available for F and D schools see Chakrabarti (2007). The commissioner of
education (responsible for budget development and school assessment/accountability)
was also allowed to give preference to these schools when allocating Federal and State
grants designed to improve student achievement (FLDOE, Rule 6A-1.09981, 1999).
As a result, I believe that school spending may be determined, in part, by student
achievement, and therefore treating spending as an exogenous covariate may lead to
biased estimates.
In order to control for endogenous school spending I used district-level property
taxes as an instrumental variable, however, it is important to note that student
achievement was measured at the school level. The chosen instrument was mea-
sured as the total dollar value of property taxes levied per capita at the district-level.
(These gures were calculated by the Florida Legislative Committee on Intergovern-
mental Relations (LCIR) sta¤ as the total property taxes levied per county divided
by county population estimates. The Southeast Consumer Price Index (CPI) data,
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collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, was then used to transform these g-
ures into 1999 dollars.) Florida public schools are nanced with a mixture of state,
local and federal funding. Specically, in 2007 Florida school districts received ap-
proximately 40% of their nances from state sources, supplied primarily from legisla-
tive appropriations; 50% from local funds, provided mainly by property taxes; and
10% from the federal government. Since school districts are funded in large part by
property taxes, this instrument should be highly correlated with school spending.
Descriptive statistics indicate that school spending per student was larger in districts
with higher property taxes per capita, as the correlation coe¢ cient between these two
variables is 0.346. This indicates that the chosen instrument is moderately correlated
with the endogenous explanatory variable. This instrument has been used previously
in the literature by Ferguson and Ladd (1996), however, one issue is that student
achievement may have a positive e¤ect on housing prices, which could invalidate the
chosen instrument (Black, 1999; Figlio and Lucas, 2004). Therefore, to dissolve any
relationship that may exist between school-level student achievement and district-
level property taxes, the sample is comprised only of those schools located within the
larger Florida school districts where there will likely be a mixture of high perform-
ing and low performing schools. Thus, even if one school displays very high student
achievement, this should not boost all property values in the entire district, merely
those located in close proximity to the high performing school. Furthermore, Florida
saw a large increase in housing prices during this time period due to increased real
estate investment (in what is commonly referred to as the housing bubble). Thus
there was an increase in property taxes and in turn an increase in school spending
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which was unrelated to student achievement. These unique circumstances provide
additional justication for the validity of the chosen instrument.
The variables used in the analysis are dened and summarized in Table 1. The
explanatory variables can be separated into three subcategories: time varying regres-
sors, xit; (including GIFT, DISAB, ABSENT, and DEGREE) which will be treated
with the Chamberlain-device, regressors with little or no variation across time, git;
(including PARENT EDUC, BLACK, HISPANIC, ENGLISH, and INSTRUCT), and
the potentially endogenous explanatory variable, qit; (EXPEND), which was measured
as real spending in 1999 dollars, and was calculated using the Southeast CPI data.
4.2.1 Standardized test pass rates and state assigned school grades
In line with the A+ plan the outcome variable of interest, student achievement, was
measured using each schools overall FCAT performance. The FCAT exams were
graded on a scale of 1 (lowest) through 5 (highest) where levels 1 and 2 represent
below basicachievement and basicachievement respectively, while levels 3 and
above correspond to prociency.The analysis focused on fourth grade reading and
fth grade math outcomes as these were the only primary grade levels tested contin-
uously throughout the sample period.13
The FSIR database provided detailed information on the percentage of students
scoring in each of the ve FCAT achievement levels. From this I created measures
13Currently the FCAT is administered to all students in grades 3 through 10, testing their knowl-
edge in math, reading, writing, and science. Though, when rst implemented in 1998, the reading
exams were only given to students in grades 4, 8, and 10 while the math exams were given to stu-
dents in grades 5, 8, and 10. It was not until 2001 that the FCAT exams were extended to all grades
between third and tenth.
38
indicating the percentage of fourth graders at school i time t that passed the reading
FCAT exam and the percentage of fth graders that passed the math FCAT exam
(achieved a level 3 or higher). These outcome measures, denoted READ_PASS and
MATH_PASS, were chosen for their policy relevance as they were the main measures
used by the state to calculate school grades.
Overall, the average pass rate for the 4th grade reading exam was 57.8% and
ranged from 7% up to 99%, while the average pass rate for the 5th grade math exam
was 47.6% and ranged from 0% to 95%. Table 2 displays more descriptive summary
statistics on pass rates for the fourth grade reading FCAT. The table indicates that
for every percentile, the proportion of students passing increased in every year with
the exception of the year 2000. In the beginning of the sample period FCAT pass
rates increased slightly from one year to the next, but towards the end of the sample
period, these yearly gains were much more prominent. For example, in 1999 the
reading pass rate among the lowest 10th percentile of schools was only 27%, in 2002
it had risen to 33%, and by 2005 this had risen to 52%. For schools in the 50th
percentile, the pass rate rose from 53% in 1999 to 55% in 2002, and dramatically up
to 71% in 2005. Finally, for those in the top 90th percentile, the pass rate rose from
74% in 1999, to 75% in 2002, and 87% in 2005.
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Table 3 reports similar summary statistics for the fth grade math FCAT exam.
The pass rates associated with the math exam were almost always lower than those
of the reading exam. However, the table reveals a similar pattern of increased im-
provement over time. Papke (2005) and Papke and Wooldridge (2008) found a similar
trend (of increased achievement) to exist among public school students in the state
of Michigan. They attributed this to a teaching to the test phenomenon,making
the tests easier over time, increased real spending, or some combination of these
(Papke and Wooldridge, p. 127). In this paper, I try to determine how much of this
increase in student achievement among Florida students, if any, can be attributed to
an increase in real spending.
In order to put these gures into perspective, Tables 4 and 5 illustrate how FCAT
performance varied across the state assigned school grades. For the average A school
roughly 70% of the fourth grade students passed the reading test, and 60% of the fth
graders passed the math test. Among these students about 8% scored a perfect 5 out
of 5, and more than 25% scored a level 4, while less than 17% of the schools students
received a level 1 (the lowest possible score). Conversely, for the average F school, the
passing rates for the reading and math exams were 22% and 15% respectively, and
for both exams, less than 1% of the student population had achieved a level 5, less
than 5% had achieved a level 4, and over 55% of the schools students had received a
level 1.
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Table 2: Pass rates on 4th grade reading FCAT. Percentiles, 1999-2005
Year 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
1999 27% 39% 53% 66% 74%
2000 28% 39% 51% 63% 72%
2001 31% 41% 52% 64% 73%
2002 33% 43% 55% 66% 75%
2003 37% 48% 60% 71% 80%
2004 49% 59% 69% 78% 85%
2005 52% 61% 71% 79% 87%
Table 3: Pass rates on 5th grade math FCAT. Percentiles, 1999-2005
Year 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
1999 15% 25% 38% 50% 62%
2000 23% 32% 44% 56% 65%
2001 25% 35% 46% 58% 68%
2002 27% 36% 48% 61% 70%
2003 28% 38% 50% 61% 73%
2004 29% 39% 51% 63% 73%
2005 33% 44% 56% 67% 77%
4.2.2 Expenditures per pupil and instrumental variables
The average school in the sample spent roughly $4,700 per student in a given year (in
1999 dollars) though this ranged from $722 up to $12,808 per student. Three schools
in the sample had a budget of less than $1,000 per student (all of which were during
the 2000 school year) and seven had a budget of over $10,000 per student (all in 2005).
Interestingly, the three lowest spending schools were all located in Broward county
and were all higher performing schools as two of the three had been assigned an A
grade by the state and the third had received a B (in 2000). Conversely, the seven
highest spending schools were all located in Miami-Dade county, and among these
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Table 4: FCAT scores (by state assigned school grades) 4th grade reading exam
Percentage of Students at Each Achievement Level
School Grade % Pass Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
A 70.7% 16.2% 12.9% 33.0% 29.1% 8.6%
B 60.3% 23.3% 16.1% 32.9% 22.1% 5.3%
C 48.9% 32.7% 18.3% 29.8% 16.1% 3.0%
D 31.7% 50.7% 17.5% 22.2% 8.4% 1.1%
F 21.8% 61.5% 16.4% 16.9% 4.4% 0.5%
Table 5: FCAT scores (by state assigned school grade) 5th grade math exam
Percentage of Students at Each Achievement Level
School Grade % Pass Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level4 Level 5
A 60.5% 14.9% 24.3% 26.4% 25.7% 8.4%
B 50.3% 21.3% 28.1% 25.1% 20.1% 5.1%
C 37.4% 30.2% 32.2% 21.6% 13.3% 2.5%
D 23.9% 45.2% 30.7% 15.7% 7.1% 1.1%
F 15.03% 56.7% 28.0% 11.0% 3.7% 0.33%
schools only one was awarded an A grade, two had received Cs, and the remaining
four had all been assigned D grades (in 2005).14
Table 6 contains percentiles of spending per pupil from 1999 through 2005. For
each percentile, average expenditures per pupil rose every year except between the
years 2001 and 2002. For example, in 1999 the lowest 10th percentile of schools spent
an average of $3,371 per student, and in 2005 they spent an average of $4,282 per
student, an increase of 27% in 7 years. Among schools spending in the top 90th
percentile, average per pupil spending rose from $5,342 in 1999 to $6,954 in 2005, an
14To determine whether these outliers had any impact on the subsequent analysis, additional
MCMC simulations were performed without such outliers included. The results were una¤ected.
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increase of 30% in 7 years. These gures also indicate that there was a large spending
gap between the higher spending schools and the lower spending schools during the
sample period. In each year, schools in the 50th spending percentile spent roughly
20% more than those in the 10th percentile, and schools in the top 90th spending
percentile spent roughly 60% more than those in the 10th percentile.
Table 7 reports average school spending per-student across state assigned school
grades and by year. The table indicates that, throughout the grade distribution,
school spending had increased over time. Furthermore, regardless of the year, the
lower performing D and F schools spent a considerable amount more per student than
the higher performing A, B, and C schools. For example, the average A school only
spent $3,773 per student in 1999 compared to $4,642 per student among D schools and
$5,144 among F schools. While, in 2005 average per-pupil spending among A schools
was $5,338, but over $6,000 for the lower performing D and F schools. This indicates
that Florida schools were likely funded in a compensatory manner; perhaps due in
part by the assistance and intervention plans assigned to the lower performing schools,
as mandated by the A+ plan for education. This suggests that variations in school
spending were not exogenous; rather they were determined in part by school grades
and ultimately by student achievement. I therefore adopt an instrumental variables
approach whereby the selection equation models school spending as a function of
school level characteristics as well as an additional district level exclusion restriction.
Table 8 contains summary statistics for the instrumental variable. The table
indicates that for every percentile, district level property taxes per capita increased
during every year of the sample period. For example, in 1999 median property taxes
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was roughly $374 per capita and in the year 2005 median property taxes was $492
per capita, an increase of 31%. Much of this can be attributed to the rise in housing
prices caused by the real estate boom of the late 90s and early-2000s.
4.2.3 Additional control variables
While the main goal was to analyze the impact of school spending on student achieve-
ment, I also included additional explanatory variables for family background, student
composition, race/ethnicity, and teacher characteristics which have previously been
shown to a¤ect student achievement.
Family background has consistently been found to be a strong indicator of student
achievement (Coleman et al., 1966; Jencks et al., 1972; Mayer, 1997; Davis-Keane,
2005). To try and account for this, much of the research attempts to include infor-
mation regarding parental education and family income. However, in two separate
studies Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1991) and Dewey et al. (2000) have shown
that including family income measures (or proxies for family income) as an input in
the EPF may lead to confounding results due to endogeneity and/or multicollinear-
ity because richer families are more likely to send their children to better schools
(leading to endogeneity), or perhaps to schools that spend more money (leading to
multicollinearity). As an alternative, both Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1991)
and Dewey et al. (2000) suggest using parental education as the only measure of
family background. Therefore in this analysis family background was measured using
the adult education rate (percentage of adults age 25 or older with a Bachelors degree
or higher) associated with each schools neighborhood, according to the US Census
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Table 6: School level expenditures per pupil in 1999 dollars. Percentiles, 1999-2005
Year 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
1999 $3,371 $3,655 $4,027 $4,567 $5,342
2000 $3,380 $3,690 $4,169 $4,753 $5,392
2001 $3,549 $3,907 $4,375 $5,031 $5,740
2002 $3,464 $3,878 $4,348 5,019 $5,693
2003 $3,641 $4,004 $4,577 $5,188 $5,883
2004 $3,875 $4,317 $4,903 $5,610 $6,341
2005 $4,282 $4,750 $5,377 $6,140 $6,954
(2000). The average adult education rate was 22.9%, though this ranged from 0.6%
up to 58.3%.
Student composition was controlled for with the inclusion of the percentage of
students classied into gifted, special education, and English as a second language
(ESOL) programs (Variables GIFT, DISAB, and ENGLISH respectively). On av-
erage, roughly 4% of a schools students were classied as gifted, 15.6% as special
education, and 9.8% as limited English procient. Gifted programs usually provide a
more advanced curriculum than those of an average students whereas the converse
is true for programs focusing on students with learning disabilities. Therefore I as-
sume, a priori, that schools with a higher percentage of gifted students were likely
to perform better on standardized tests, while schools with a larger proportion of
special education students may have performed worse. This latter assumption must
be considered carefully however, as many special education students were legally ex-
empt from taking the FCAT exams.15 Some researchers have proposed that schools
15State law mandates that all students in the appropriate grade levels must participate in state
assessments like the FCATs. However, the inclusion of special education students is determined by
each students Individual Education Plan (IEP).
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Table 7: Average expenditures per pupil by school grade and year in 1999 dollars
School Grade 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
A $3,773 $4,034 $4,265 $4,226 $4,442 $4,790 $5,338
B $3,882 $3,896 $4,322 $4,431 $4,704 $5,100 $5,543
C $4,035 $4,305 $4,546 $4,747 $5,196 $5,612 $5,973
D $4,642 $5,082 $5,490 $5,300 $6,194 $6,637 $6,622
F $5,144 $4,944 - $5,811 $5,249 - $6,036
Table 8: Total taxes levied per capita (district level) in 1999 dollars. Percentiles,
1999-2005
Year 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
1999 $229.78 $267.82 $374.30 $396.79 $402.49
2000 $234.04 $300.11 $379.98 $419.88 $452.68
2001 $241.76 $308.45 $387.19 $420.42 $471.04
2002 $274.30 $335.41 $403.42 $460.55 $508.04
2003 $291.68 $359.01 $429.89 $489.89 $523.75
2004 $306.52 $380.66 $456.77 $527.43 $555.80
2005 $352.52 $430.48 $492.17 $567.19 $604.23
may have even used this law to their advantage by classifying some of their poorer
test takers into special education programs in an attempt to raise test pass rates
(Figlio and Getzler, 2002; Jacob, 2005; Cullen and Reback, 2006). If this is true,
then DISAB may have no association or even a positive e¤ect on FCAT pass rates.
Finally, I assume a priori that ENGLISH has a negative e¤ect on the FCAT exams
since both exams require a comprehensive understanding of the English language.16
Among the racial/ethnicity measures, the mean percentage of Black and His-
panic students in attendance were 27% and 20.4% respectively. Previous studies have
16The negative e¤ect of ENGLISH may be negligible because ESOL students are not required to
take the FCAT exam during their rst two years in the program.
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consistently found a negative relationship between BLACK and student achievement
(Rivkin, 1995; Fryer and Levitt, 2004; Neal, 2006; Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin, 2009).
However, the e¤ect of HISPANIC might not be as straightforward, especially in the
state of Florida. At the national level, studies have typically found that Hispanic
students score lower on standardized test scores than do White students (Ingels et
al., 1994; National Center for Education Statistics, 1998; Phillips, 2000; U.S. De-
partment of Education, 2005), which many have attributed to language acquisition
barriers(Wojtkiewicz and Donato, 1995; National Center for Education Statistics,
1995; Bali and Alvarez, 2004). However, in Florida the Hispanic population consists
of a large proportion of Cuban and Puerto Rican families who place a strong emphasis
on education and tend to speak better English relative to Hispanics living elsewhere
in the United States (EDRFL, 2005). Furthermore, since I am also controlling for
the proportion of students with limited English prociency, the coe¢ cient associated
with Hispanic may only capture the achievement e¤ect for those Hispanic students
that can speak English well. Therefore, a priori, I assume that BLACK will have a
negative e¤ect on student achievement but make no such assumptions with respect
to the HISPANIC coe¢ cients.
To control for the variation in school and teacher quality I also included measures
for teacherseducation and the percentage of each schools sta¤ devoted to instruc-
tional purposes. Teacherseducation, as measured by the percentage of teachers with
advanced degrees, is of great interest because most states associate advanced degrees
with teacher quality and award higher salaries to those holding a masters or doc-
torate degree (Goldhaber and Brewer 1998). For example in 2005 the average salary
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for a Florida school teacher with a Bachelors degree was $38,516, while those with
a Masters or Doctorate degree earned an average salary of $45,678 and $52,047 re-
spectively (Florida Department of Education, 2005). Those in favor of this increased
pay scale argue that teachers with advanced degrees have a higher level of knowledge
and expertise which they can pass on to their students. While a few studies have
suggested that this may be true (Ferguson, 1991; Greenwald et al., 1996), the ma-
jority of research has concluded that no such e¤ect exists; teacherseducation has no
signicant impact on student achievement (Hanushek, 1986; Hanushek, 1997; Jepsen
and Rivkin, 2002; Rowan et al., 2002; Buddin and Zamarro, 2009). Kelly Henson,
the director of Georgias Professional Standards Commission, stated that one possi-
ble explanation for this relationship, or lack thereof, is that some teachers might be
taking the path of least resistance to get a pay raise.Suggesting that some teachers
are obtaining their advanced degrees from online colleges that o¤er less demanding
curricula or are receiving their degrees in elds unrelated to the subjects they teach
because the coursework might be easier. In the sample the mean proportion of teach-
ers with a masters degree or higher was 32.1%, and approximately 65% of the schools
sta¤ was employed for instructional purposes. I assume a priori that the percentage
of a schools sta¤ devoted to instructional purposes (INSTRUCT) will be positively
associated with student achievement but make no such assumption with regards to
the percentage of teachers with an advanced degree (DEGREE.) Finally, I controlled
for the percentage of students absent for more than 21 days in a school year, as these
students miss more of the curriculum than their cohorts and therefore it is likely that
they would perform worse on the FCAT exams than the average student.
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4.3 Results
To initiate the Gibbs sampler, starting values for the model parameters were ran-
domly drawn from the uniform distribution bounded between 0 and 1, and values
for the projection error terms ai and bi were randomly drawn from the normal dis-
tribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.1.17 The reason for why the di¤use
priors were not used to draw the initial values was that when I did so it took consid-
erably more time for the Markov chain of the multi-parameter model to converge to
the stationary distribution. I t the baseline models (both the linear and fractional
probit models, assuming strict exogeneity) using the algorithm outlined in Section 2,
running the Markov chains for 20,000 iterations, following an initial 5,000 replication
burn-in phase. The IV models were then estimated using the algorithm outlined in
Section 3. After some preliminary simulations, I found that the sequential draws
of the IV models (both linear and fractional probit) displayed higher degrees of au-
tocorrelation, indicating that the simulations may be slower to converge. This was
addressed by running longer MCMC simulations of 35,000 iterations with an initial
20,000 replication burn-in phase. Separate models were t for each FCAT exam (4th
grade reading and 5th grade math).
In Table 9 I present the posterior estimates for the baseline models (linear and
fractional probit) with 4th grade reading pass rates as the dependent variable. The
table reports posterior means, posterior standard deviations (SD) and 95% highest
posterior density intervals (HPDI) for all parameters listed in Table 1. The results
found for the 5th grade math exam (reported in Table 10) were very similar to those
17For the linear model ai and bi are drawn from the standard normal distribution N(0; 1).
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presented in Table 9, and therefore I limit my discussion to the estimates associated
with 4th grade reading.
The baseline results suggest that an increase in per pupil expenditures does in
fact have a positive and signicant e¤ect on reading pass rates among 4th grade
students. This holds true for both the linear specication and the fractional probit
model. However, in the probit model the estimated spending e¤ect is slightly smaller.
This is consistent with the notion that spending may exhibit diminishing marginal
returns which can be accounted for in the probit model. Conversely, the linear model
assumes a constant relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome
variable, and therefore may slightly overestimate the true spending e¤ect. Further-
more, the standard errors of the probit model are much smaller than those from the
linear specication resulting in much stronger e¤ects. Thus, the e¤ect of expenditure
is sharpened up with the more robust model specication. One advantage for using
the linear model, however, is that the slope coe¢ cients are easy to interpret since
they have a one-to-one correspondence with the marginal e¤ects. For instance, in
the linear model the estimated posterior mean of spending is 0.066. This implies
that a $1,000 increase in per student spending would increase reading pass rates by
6.6%. Conversely, in the probit model, the slope coe¢ cient is 0.173, and is statisti-
cally signicant, however, for interpretation the marginal e¤ects must be calculated.
Therefore, I also estimate the posterior distribution for the marginal e¤ects of all pa-
rameters (using sample average values ofWit; over N and T ) and report the posterior
means, standard deviations, and highest posterior density intervals of the marginal
e¤ects in the last three columns of Table 9. For the marginal e¤ect of spending, I
51
nd a posterior mean of 0.062, indicating that a $1,000 increase in spending would
increase pass rates by 6.2%; a nontrivial e¤ect, almost identical to that of the linear
model.
The posterior distributions of the marginal e¤ects of spending are plotted below
in Figures 1 and 2. For the linear model (Figure 1), the spending e¤ect ranges from
0.0097 to 0.1202, while in the probit model (Figure 2), the posterior distribution of
the marginal e¤ect ranges from 0.0603 to 0.0643. These plots show that the spending
e¤ect is always positive as the entire posterior distribution is above zero in both
models.
The posterior estimates also indicate that PARENT EDUC, INSTRUCT and
GIFT all have large positive e¤ects on reading FCAT pass rates.18 While DEGREE
has a small positive e¤ect, and BLACK has a small negative e¤ect. The posterior
mean for HISPANIC and ENGLISH are statistically insignicant in the linear model,
but display a positive e¤ect in the nonlinear model, and DISAB has a positive and
signicant posterior mean in both models. The latter could imply that schools were
trying to game the systemby classifying some of their poorer test takers into test-
exempt special education programs. However, it is also possible that these estimates
are a by-product of model misspecication since the baseline models do not account
for endogenous spending. Thus, if Florida schools follow a compensatory funding
scheme these results may be biased
18According to the estimated marginal e¤ects of the fractional probit model (reported in table 9) a
10% increase in the percentage of sta¤ devoted for instructional purposes would, on average lead to a
4.8% increase in pass rates, while a 10% increase in the percentage of gifted students would increase
pass rates by 6.4%. Parental education has close to a one-to-one correspondence with reading pass
rates, (a 10% increase in the adult education rate would lead to a 9.2% increase in pass rates).
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In order to allow for endogenous spending I apply the IV method outlined in
Section 3. The selection equation, used to estimate school spending, includes all
explanatory variables from the original outcome equation as well as the instrument,
real property taxes per-capita measured at the district level. In Table 11 I display the
posterior results of the spending equation. Since spending is measured as a continuous
variable the selection equation is always linear, therefore the slope coe¢ cients can be
treated as the marginal e¤ects in both the linear model and the fractional probit
model.
The results reported in Table 11 indicate that the chosen instrument, property
taxes per-capita, has a strong positive e¤ect on school expenditures in both the linear
and nonlinear model; this helps justify the choice in instruments. The table also
indicates that the proportion of students classied into gifted, special education, and
English as a second language programs all have a positive impact on school spending.
This is expected since these specialized classes are generally smaller in size and taught
by specialists or teachers with additional certications who are typically paid a higher
salary. The proportion of teachers with advanced degrees also displays a positive
e¤ect which is consistent with school spending patterns, as the average salary was
roughly 18.5% greater for teachers with a Masters compared to a Bachelors degree,
and 35% higher for those with a Doctorate versus a Bachelors. Interestingly, I nd
that parental education has a negative e¤ect on school spending. This is consistent
with previous research which has indicated that, on average, higher educated parents
place a greater weight on their childrens education (Coleman, et al., 1966; Hanushek,
1996; Davis-Keane, 2005). Therefore, it is more likely that higher educated parents
55
Figure 1: Posterior distribution of spending linear model
Figure 2: Posterior distribution of spending fractional probit model
56
would enroll their children into higher performing A or B schools, which as illustrated
in Table 7, spend less money on average than their lower performing counterparts.
Thus a higher adult education rate may be associated with lower school spending but
higher school quality.
Finally, Table 12 presents the estimated results of the structural equation with
endogenous spending and 4th grade reading pass rates as the dependent variable.
Once again the discussion is limited to the estimates associated with the 4th grade
reading exam. Estimates for the 5th grade math exam are reported in Table 13 and
are very similar to those reported in Table 12.
Similar to the baseline results, I nd a spending e¤ect that is positive and sta-
tistically signicant; however, compared to the baseline model, this e¤ect is much
larger in magnitude. In the linear IV model, the posterior mean for EXPEND is
0.101, indicating that a $1,000 increase in per pupil spending would lead to a 10.1%
increase in reading pass rates. This is more than 3 percentage points larger than the
estimated e¤ect from the baseline linear model.
In the fractional probit IV model the posterior mean for school spending is 0.268,
which is more than 1.5 times larger than the spending coe¢ cient in the baseline probit
model. To interpret this coe¢ cient I calculate the marginal e¤ects (reported in the
last set of columns of Table 12), and nd an estimated spending e¤ect (posterior
mean of the marginal e¤ect of spending) of 9.6%. Thus, I nd that the estimated
e¤ects of both the linear IV and fractional probit IV models are similar, although the
probit estimates are slightly smaller, as are their standard errors.
57
Table 11: Posterior estimates for 4th grade reading. Expenditure equation
Linear Model Fractional Probit Model
Variable Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
Mean SD HPDI Mean SD HPDI
TAXES 7.24 (0.20) (6.75, 7.54) 8.45 (0.26) (8.04, 9.04)
PARENT EDUC -1.55 (0.37) (-2.25, -0.82) -1.64 (0.35) (-2.40, -0.99)
BLACK 1.03 (0.16) (0.70, 1.34) 1.12 (0.17) (0.75, 1.40)
HISPANIC -0.44 (0.25) (-0.92, 0.04) -0.38 (0.26) (-0.89, 0.16)
ENGLISH 1.22 (0.19) (0.857, 1.59) 1.59 (0.24) (1.15, 2.09)
INSTRUCT -0.56 (0.18) (-0.91, -0.21) -1.16 (0.18) (-1.52, -0.83)
GIFT 1.25 (0.15) (0.95, 1.54) 1.40 (0.23) (0.94, 1.84)
DISAB 1.34 (0.13) (1.096, 1.61) 0.94 (0.18) (0.58, 1.26)
ABSENT -0.022 (0.22) (-0.45, 0.41) -0.20 (0.23) (-0.66, 0.23)
DEGREE 0.37 (0.07) (0.23, 0.49) 0.33 (0.07) (0.18, 0.47)
For the IV models, the posterior distributions of the marginal e¤ects of spending
are plotted in Figures 3 and 4. For the linear IV model (Figure 3), the spending
e¤ect ranges from 0.015 to 0.192, while for the fractional probit IV model (Figure
4), the posterior distribution of the marginal e¤ect ranges from 0.0748 to 0.1095.
Similar to the baseline models, these plots indicate that the spending e¤ect is always
positive as the entire posterior distribution is above zero in both models; though the
estimated marginal e¤ects are more than 50% larger for the IV models. Observing IV
estimates above the baseline estimates is consistent with previous literature (Ferguson
and Ladd, 1996; Dewey at al., 2000; Roy, 2003; Levacic et al., 2005; Papke and
Wooldridge, 2008) and is also consistent with the idea that Florida schools were
funded in a compensatory manner.
The IV results presented in Table 12 also indicate that parental education has a
positive e¤ect on student achievement. According to the fractional probit IV model,
a 10% increase in the adult education rate is associated with a 3.6% increase in
58
reading pass rates. While this e¤ect is nontrivial, it would be very di¢ cult for a
community to increase the adult education rate by 10%, therefore its relevance from
a policy perspective is negligible. Of greater interest are the posterior estimates
associated with INSTRUCT and DEGREE, two inputs that schools do have control
over. I nd that INSTRUCT has a strong positive e¤ect on student outcomes, while
DEGREE does not. Focusing on the fractional probit IV estimates, a 10% increase
in the percentage of sta¤ devoted to instruction (INSTRUCT) would, on average,
increase reading pass rates by 4.8%, a relatively large e¤ect; while a 10% increase
in the percentage of teachers with advanced degrees would only increase pass rates
by 0.35%, an almost nonexistent e¤ect. It is important to note here that this does
not imply that teacher quality is irrelevant; in fact numerous studies have found that
variations in teacher quality have a large impact on student achievement (Murnane
and Phillips, 1981; Hanushek, 1992; Rivkin et al., 2005). Rather this simply implies
that teachers education may not be a very strong indicator for teacher quality as was
discussed earlier.
The IV results also indicate that GIFT has a large positive e¤ect on reading pass
rates, while the posterior mean of DISAB is now insignicant. This implies that
schools were probably not classifying the poorer test takers into test-exempt special
education programs just to boost FCAT scores, as was suggested by the baseline re-
sults. To investigate this further I look at the special education classication rate for
all Florida elementary schools in the sample between 1997 and 2005. The average clas-
sication rates are reported in Table 14. Two extra years of data are included (1997
and 1998) in order to determine whether the introduction of either the FCAT exam-
59
inations (in 1998) or the implementation of school accountability reforms (in 1999)
had any impact on the classication rate. If schools were gaming the systemand
classifying their poorer test takers into test-exempt special education programs there
would likely be a large spike in the classication rate shortly after the introduction of
the FCAT exams and/or after the A+ plan. Instead the classication rate was fairly
stable throughout the sample period, thus providing little evidence to indicate that
schools were gaming the system.The posterior mean of BLACK is still negative,
which is expected, while HISPANIC is now positive. This is consistent with previ-
ous research indicating that the Hispanic population in Florida places a very strong
emphasis on education (EDRFL, 2005), and also because I am already accounting
for limited English prociency. Furthermore, Hanushek and Raymond (2004) found
that, while school accountability reforms such as the A+ plan for education led to
wider achievement gaps between Black and White students, they actually narrowed
the Hispanic-White achievement gap.
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Table 14: Special education classication rates, 1997-2005
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Classication Rate 14.5% 14.9% 15.1% 15.4% 15.6% 15.5% 15.9% 16.0% 15.8%
Figure 3: Posterior distribution of spending linear IV model
Figure 4: Posterior distribution of spending fractional probit IV model
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5 Model comparison
In this paper I consider two fractional probit models with correlated random e¤ects:
the single equation baseline model which assumes that all explanatory variables are
exogenous and the simultaneous equation IV model which allows for endogeneity.
The single equation model is obtained by restricting the covariance parameter, u";
to zero while the IV model leaves u" unconstrained. Thus I can perform a formal
test of endogeneity by setting u" to zero and testing the null hypothesis H0 : u" = 0
against the alternative H1 : u" 6= 0:
Denoting M1 as the constrained model and M2 as the unconstrained model, the
Bayes factor for the null hypothesis is dened as
B1;2 =
m(y jM1)
m(y jM2) ;
where m(yjMj) is the marginal likelihood of the model specication Mj, j = 1; 2:
Since M1 is simply a nested form of M2 The Bayes factor, BF1;2; can be calculated
by using the Savage-Dickey density ratio approach (Verdinelli and Wasserman, 1995).
Specically,
B1;2 =
p(u" j data)
p(u")
;
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where p(u" j data) is the posterior density of the covariance parameter, ue; and p(ue)
is the prior of u" calculated at the points 

ue = 0. Estimating the prior density at
ue is straightforward, however, the unconditional posterior density p(

ue j data) is
unknown and must be estimated using the output from the MCMC simulation. The
posterior density of ue can be estimated by averaging the full conditional densities
over the number of MCMC draws and conditioning on the model parameters and
augmented data (Deb, Munkin and Trivedi, 2009 ).19 This can be written as:
ep(uejdata) = 1
R
RX
r=1
p(ue j y(R)its ; a(R)i ; b(R)i ;
(R);(R); 2(R)a ; 2(R)b ; R" );
which should be evaluated at ue:
Similar tests can be imposed in order to test whether the correlated random e¤ects
specication is appropriate by restricting  to zero in the baseline models, and both
 and  to zero in the IV models. In total there are three possible specication tests
that need to be implemented. Each test compares a nested model with a non-nested
model, and therefore the Savage-Dickey density ratio approach can be applied to all
three.
First, I test whether the correlated random e¤ects specication is appropriate in
the baseline models by testing the joint null hypothesis H0 : 1; :::;T = 0 against the
alternative which leaves these parameters unconstrained. The test for the joint null
hypothesis H0 : 1; :::;T = 0 is strongly rejected for both models as the posterior
mean and standard deviation of the estimated Bayes factor is 2:94  10 21 (2:21 
19Note: In the linear model, the posterior of ue would be conditioned with respect to all of the
same model parameters except yits.
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10 19) for the linear model and 3:3410 51 (4:7810 52) for the probit model. Thus
providing overwhelming support in favor of the CRE specication.
For the IV models, I test whether the correlated random e¤ects specication
is appropriate in the outcome equation by testing the joint null hypothesis H0 :
1; :::;T = 0 against the alternative which leaves these parameters unconstrained,
and for the expenditure equation I test the joint null hypothesis ofH0 : 1; :::;T = 0:
In both the linear model and the fractional probit model, the null hypotheses are
strongly rejected with posterior means and standard deviations of less than 0.001,
again providing evidence in favor of the CRE specications.
To determine whether spending is endogenous I focus on the covariance parameter,
u"; which captures dependence between the error term in the outcome equation, u;
and the error term in the expenditure equation ": In Figures 5 and 6 I plot the posterior
distribution of u": If spending were truly exogenous, the posterior distribution of u"
would be centered at zero. However, in the linear model (Figure 5) the posterior is
centered at  0:0761 and is separated from zero by more than two standard deviations
(0:029), and in the probit model (Figure 6) u" is centered at  0:178 which is more
than 4 standard deviations (0:037) away from zero. This provides some evidence
of endogeneity. As a formal test I calculate the Bayes factor with null hypothesis
H0 : u" = 0 against HA : u" 6= 0: The posterior mean and standard deviation of the
estimated Bayes factor is 0:0014 (0:00023) for the linear model and 0:00136 (0:000195)
for the fractional probit, both of which reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity,
thus providing evidence in favor of using the IV models over the baseline methods.
Finally, in Figure 7 I plot the marginal e¤ects of spending at di¤erent spending
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Figure 5: Posterior distribution of deltaUE linear IV model
Figure 6: Posterior distribution of deltaUE fractional probit IV model
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Figure 7: Marginal e¤ects (of school spending) at di¤erent percentiles of spending
fractional probit models
levels, using the fractional probit models. This is done to assess the importance
of using a nonlinear model to allow for diminishing marginal returns of spending.
The estimated marginal e¤ects are calculated at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th
percentiles of the spending distribution, while all other explanatory variables are
averaged over N and T: For the baseline model, the estimated marginal e¤ects are
calculated using Equation (10), while the IV model estimates are calculated using
Equation (21). For both models I nd that the marginal e¤ects are larger among
schools with below median spending levels, and as spending increases above the 50th
percentile the marginal e¤ects decrease. This indicates that a $1,000 increase in
spending will have a larger impact on pass rates among lower spending schools than
it would among the higher spending schools. Therefore, to capture this diminishing
marginal e¤ect of spending on test pass rates, a nonlinear specication seems more
appropriate than the traditional linear specication.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper I used various models to examine the relationship between school spend-
ing and test pass rates among Florida elementary schools. For all models, Bayesian
estimation methods were proposed through the use of Gibbs sampling (and data aug-
mentation in the fractional probit models), which allowed for e¢ cient estimation of
all parameters of interest.
In the empirical analysis I did not examine the e¤ects of school accountability
programs such as the A+ plan for education and the NCLB nor did I attempt to
identify any teaching to the test phenomenon. Rather, the main focus of the
analysis was to quantify a causal relationship between school spending and student
achievement.
In all model specications I found that real school spending had a positive and
statistically signicant e¤ect on student achievement. When estimating the average
e¤ect of spending, I found that the linear estimates and nonlinear fractional probit
estimates were very similar, although the nonlinear estimates were slightly smaller
in magnitude and more precise. When estimating the marginal e¤ects of spending
at various spending levels, I found evidence of diminishing marginal e¤ects, giving
greater motivation for the nonlinear models which allow for diminishing returns. Fur-
thermore, the standard errors of all variables were much smaller in magnitude in
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the nonlinear specications than in the linear models and therefore specifying the
fractional probit led to large gains in e¢ ciency.
Using the MCMC algorithms proposed in this paper, it was rather straightforward
to obtain slope coe¢ cients and marginal e¤ects for the nonlinear fractional probit
models, however, estimation required the introduction of an augmented dataset which
increased the dimensions of the parameter space by S  T observations per school.
This can greatly increase computational time. However, if one needs to obtain more
precise estimates of the average e¤ects and/or estimates beyond the average e¤ects,
such as marginal e¤ects across the distribution of a particular variable or variables,
then the fractional probit models may be better suited.
Finally, in both the linear and nonlinear specications, allowing for potential
endogeneity of spending led to estimated spending e¤ects that were roughly 50%
larger than those found in the models which assume spending is strictly exogenous.
For instance, in the single-equation baseline models the estimated e¤ect of a $1,000
increase in per pupil spending was an average increase in pass rates ranging from
6.2% (fractional probit model) to 6.6% (linear model). Whereas, in the simultaneous
equation IV models the estimated spending e¤ect increased to 9.6-10.1%.
Based on the formal Bayes factor specication tests, I found strong evidence in
favor of the conclusion that school spending was endogenously related to student
achievement, and in this case, failure to account for endogeneity could lead to esti-
mated spending e¤ects which were biased downwards. Of course, the IV results relied
on the validity of the chosen instrument, and I cannot dismiss the possibility that vari-
ations in district-level property taxes were not entirely exogenous. Furthermore, in
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an e¤ort to capture exogenous changes in the instrument, I measured property taxes
at the more aggregate district level, but test pass rates at the school level. While,
this may dissolve the relationship between property taxes and student achievement,
it left me with data that had much less variation than would data at the school level.
Therefore, leading to weaker identication of the estimated spending e¤ects. As a
result the IV estimates were less precise than were the estimates from the baseline
specication. However, this is a typical occurrence in any IV model regardless of data
aggregation.
As a nal note, while I did nd that increased spending had a fairly large posi-
tive impact on student achievement, these estimated e¤ects were based on a $1,000
increase in per-pupil spending. For the average school in the sample, this equates
to a 20% increase in spending which is rather substantial. Therefore, even though
a positive relationship between school expenditures and student achievement exists,
this does not suggest that increasing school spending would be the most e¤ective way
to increase student achievement, only that it could be part of a more comprehensive
solution.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: MCMC calculations for fractional probit baseline
model
The full augmented joint posterior can be written as
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp
"
 :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai)
#

NY
i=1
TY
t=1
 
SX
s=1
[I(dits = 1)I(y

its > 0) + I(dits = 0)I(y

its  0)]
!

(2) (1+Tk+k+h)=2 jH
j1=2 exp [ :5(
 
)0H
(
 
)]
NY
i=1
1p
2a
exp
  :5a0i 2a ai 1 (aa)baaa (2a) (aa+1) exp

  1
ba2a

: (22)
The steps of the MCMC algorithm are as follows:
1. The conditional posterior kernel for the latent variable yits is normally distributed
as yits j yit;Wit; ai;
; 2a  N [Wit
 + ai; 1]; and is truncated at zero such that
yits > 0 if dits = 1 and
yits  0 if dits = 0:
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This can be shown by collecting all terms related to yits in (22):
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp
"
 :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai)
#

NY
i=1
TY
t=1
 
SX
s=1
[I(dits = 1)I(y

its > 0) + I(dits = 0)I(y

its  0)]
!
which immediately implies that the latent variables yits are conditionally independent
with normal distribution yits j yit;Wit; ai;
; 2a  N [Wit
 + ai; 1] and each variable
is truncated at zero.
2. The full conditional density for ai is normally distributed as, ai j yit;Wit; yits;
; 2a 
N
h
ai; H
 1
a
i
; where
Ha = S  T +  2a
ai = H
 1
a
"
TX
t=1
 
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
)
!#
:
To derive this full conditional density one must use the full posterior density kernel
(22), dropping any terms that are free of ai:
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp
"
 :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai)
#

NY
i=1
1p
2a
exp
 :5a0i 2a ai :
Focusing only on the terms in the brackets, and once again dropping terms free of ai;
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I am left with
exp
 
 :5
SX
s=1

(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai) + a0i 2a ai
!
:
Then I can rewrite the term in the bracket as

(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai) + a0i 2a ai

= y
0
itsy

its   y
0
itsWit
  y
0
itsai  
0W0ityits + 
0W0itWit

+ 
0W0itai   a0iyits + a0iWit
 + a0iai + a0i 2a ai:
Again dropping any terms multiplicatively unrelated to ai:
  y0itsai + 
0W0itai   a0iyits + a0iWit
 + a0iai + a0i 2a ai
= a0i(1 + 
 2
a )ai   a0i(yits  Wit
)  (y
0
its  
0W0it)ai
Adding over s and t:
a0i(S  T +  2a )ai   a0i
"
TX
t=1
 
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
)
!#
 
"
TX
t=1
 
SX
s=1

y
0
its  
0W0it
!#
ai
= a0iHaai   a0iHaai   aiHaai:
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Then I complete the square, by adding and subtracting the term ai0Haai:
= a0iHaai   a0iHaai   ai0Haai + ai0Haai   ai0Haai
= (ai   ai)0Ha(ai   ai)  ai0Haai:
Since the last term is free of ai; this simplies to
(ai   ai)0Ha(ai   ai):
From here it is straightforward to see that ai j yit;Wit; yits;
; 2a  N
h
ai; H
 1
a
i
:
3. The full conditional of parameter vector
 can be shown to be
 j yit;Wit; yits; ai; 2a 
N
h

;H
 1


i
, where
H
 = H
 + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
W0itWit

 = H
 1


"
H

 +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
W0it
 
SX
s=1
(yits   ai)
!#
:
To derive this I collect the terms of the full posterior density kernel that are multi-
plicatively related to 
:
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i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp
"
 :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai)
#

(2) (1+Tk+k+h)=2 jH
j1=2 exp [ :5(
 
)0H
(
 
)] :
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Dropping terms unrelated to 
:
exp
 
 :5
SX
s=1

(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai) + (
 
)0H
(
 
)
!
:
Then I can rewrite the term in the bracket as

(yits  Wit
  ai)0 (yits  Wit
  ai) + (
 
)0H
(
 
)

= y
0
itsy

its   y
0
itsWit
  y
0
itsai  
0W0ityits + 
0W0itWit
 + 
0W0itai
  a0iyits + a0iWit
 + a0iai + 
0H

 
0H

 + 
0H

:
Dropping terms unrelated to 
:
  y0itsWit
 
0W0ityits + 
0W0itWit
 + 
0W0itai
+ a0iWit
 + 

0H

 
0H

 
H


= 
0(H
 + W
0
itWit)
 
0(H

 + W0ityits + W0itai)
  (
H
 + y
0
itsWit + a
0
iWit)
:
Adding over s; i; and t:

0
 
H
 + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
W0itWit
!

 
0
 
H

 +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
"
W0it
SX
s=1
(yits + ai)
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 
 

H
 +
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i=1
TX
t=1
"
SX
s=1
(y
0
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0
i)Wit
#!


= 
0H

 
0H

 
0H

:
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To complete the square I add and subtract the term 

0
H

:
= 
0H

 
0H

 
0H

 + 
0H

 
0H


= (
 
)0H
(
 
) 
0H

:
Since the last term is free of 
; I am left with
(
 
)0H
(
 
):
This shows that 
 j yit;Wit; yits; ai; 2a  N
h

;H
 1


i
:
4. The posterior distribution for 2a is inverse gamma:
2a j yit;Wit; yits; ai;
  IG
0@N
2
+ aa;
"
b 1a +
1
2
NX
i=1
a0iai
# 11A :
Collecting all terms related to 2a:
NY
i=1
1p
2a
exp
  :5a0i 2a ai 1 (aa)baaa (2a) (aa+1) exp

  1
ba2a

:
Grouping like terms together, and ignoring terms unrelated to 2a I am left with
 
2a
 (N
2
+aa+1)
exp
 :5 2a  2b 1a + a0iai :
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where, adding over i, I nd that 2a j yit;Wit; yits; ai;
  IG

aa; ba

; where
aa =
N
2
+ aa and ba =
"
b 1a +
1
2
NX
i=1
a0iai
# 1
:
This concludes the MCMC algorithm.
Appendix 2: MCMC steps for linear model with correlated
random e¤ects
1. The full conditional density for ai is normally distributed as
ai j yit;Wit;
; 2a; 2u  N
h
ai; H
 1
a
i
; where
Ha = T   2u +  2a
ai = H
 1
a
"
 2u
TX
t=1
(yit  Wit
)
#
:
2. The full joint conditional density of block 
 =[ ;t;;] is normally distributed
as 
 j yit;Wit; ai; 2a; 2u  N
h

;H
 1


i
, where
H
 = H
 +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
 2u W
0
itWit

 = H
 1


"
H

 +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
 2u W
0
it(yit   ai)
#
:
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3. The conditional posterior distribution for 2u is inverse gamma:
2u j yit;Wit; ai;
; 2a  IG
0@NT
2
+ au;
"
b 1u +
1
2
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
(yit  Wit
  ai)2
# 11A :
4. The conditional for 2a is inverse gamma:
2a j yit;Wit; ai;
; 2u  IG
0@N
2
+ aa;
"
b 1a +
1
2
NX
i=1
a0iai
# 11A :
This concludes the MCMC algorithm.
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Appendix 3: MCMC calculations for fractional probit IVmodel
The full augmented posterior distribution of the IV model is proportional to
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i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp
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 :5
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(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)
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
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t=1
1p
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 :5(qit  Qit  bi)0 1" (qit  Qit  bi)
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s=1
[I(dits = 1)I(y

its > 0) + I(dits = 0)I(y

its  0)]
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
NY
i=1
1p
2a
exp[ :5a0i 2a ai]
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i=1
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2b
exp[ :5b0i 2b bi]
(2) 
1+Tk+k+h+1
2 jH
j
1
2 exp[ :5(
 
)0H
(
 
)]
(2) 
1+TL+L+h
2 jHj
1
2 exp[ :5( )0H( )]
(2) 
1
2
Hu" 12 exp[ :5(u"   u")0Hu"(u"   u")]
1
 (aa)baaa
(2a)
 (aa+1) exp

  1
ba2a

 1
 (ab)b
ab
b
(2b)
 (ab+1) exp

  1
bb2b


1
 (a")b
a"
"
(")
 (a"+1) exp

  1
b""

: (23)
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The steps of this MCMC algorithm are as follows:
1. The posterior distribution of the latent dependent variable yits is normally distrib-
uted as
yits j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N [yits + Wit
 + ai + u""it; 1], and
is truncated at zero such that
yits > 0 if dits = 1 and
yits  0 if dits = 0;
which is based on the yits terms of the augmented posterior distribution
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i=1
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t=1
1p
2
exp
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 :5
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s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)
#

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i=1
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t=1
 
SX
s=1
[I(dits = 1)I(y

its > 0) + I(dits = 0)I(y

its  0)]
!
:
2. The full conditional density for ai is normally distributed as
ai j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; bi;
;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
ai; H
 1
a
i
where
Ha = S  T +  2a
ai = H
 1
a
"
TX
t=1
 
SX
c=1
(yits  Wit
  u""it)
!#
:
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To derive this, I drop any terms from equation (23) that are multiplicatively unrelated
to ai:
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i=1
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t=1
1p
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  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
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#

NY
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1p
2a
exp[ :5a0i 2a ai]:
Once again dropping terms free of ai:
exp
 
 :5
SX
s=1

(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it) + a0i 2a ai
!
Then I can rewrite the term in the bracket as

(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it) + a0i 2a ai

= y
0
itsy

its   y
0
itsWit
  y
0
itsai   y
0
itsu""it  
0W0ityits + 
0W0itWit

+ 
0W0itai + 

0W0itu""it   a0iyits + a0iWit
 + a0iai + a0iai + a0iu""it
  "0it0u"yits + "0it0u"Wit
 + "0it0u"ai + "0it0u"u""it + a0i 2a ai:
Again dropping terms free of ai:
  y0itsai + 
0W0itai   a0iyits + a0iWit
 + a0iai + a0iai + a0iu""0it + "0it0u"ai + a0i 2a ai
= a0i(1 + 
 2
a )ai   a0i(yits  Wit
  u""0it)  (y
0
its  
0W0it   "0it0u")ai:
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Adding over s and t:
a0i(S  T +  2a )ai   a0i
 
TX
t=1
"
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  u""0it)
#!
 
 
TX
t=1
"
SX
s=1

y
0
its  
0W0it   "0it0u"
#!
ai
= a0iHaai   a0iHaai   aiHaai:
Then I complete the square, by adding and subtracting the term ai0Haai:
= a0iHaai   a0iHaai   aiHaai + ai0Haai   ai0Haai
= (ai   ai)Ha(ai   ai)  ai0Haai:
Since the last term is free of ai; this simplies to
(ai   ai)Ha(ai   ai):
From here it is straightforward that
ai j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; bi;
;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
ai; H
 1
a
i
.
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3. The full conditional density of the parameter vector 
 is normally distributed as

 j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h

;H
 1


i
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!#
:
To show this I collect all terms from equation (23) that are related to 
:
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Once again dropping terms free of 
 I am left with
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[(yits  Wit
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Then I can rewrite the term in the bracket as
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 
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0
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+
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Again dropping terms unrelated to 
:
  y0itsWit
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0W0itWit
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0W0itai + 
0W0itu""it
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To complete the square, I add and subtract 
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:
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Which shows that 
 j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
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 1


i
:
4. The posterior distribution of the variance parameter 2a is inverse gamma, i.e.
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This is derived by collecting all terms in (20) that are multiplicatively related to 2a:
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Grouping like terms together, and ignoring terms unrelated to 2a I am left with
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5. The full conditional of bi is distributed normally as
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To show this I collect all terms from equation (23) that are related to bi:
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where "it = qit  Qit  bi: This can be written as
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Again dropping terms unrelated to bi I am left with
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Then I can re-write the term in the bracket as
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  b0i0u"ai   b0i0u"u"qit + b0i0u"u"Qit
+ b0i
0
u"u"bi + q
0
it
 1
" qit   q0it 1" Qit  q0it 1" bi  0Q0it 1" qit + 0Q0it 1" Qit
+ 0Q0it
 1
" bi   b0i 1" qit + b0i 1" Qit + b0i 1" bi + b0i 2b bi:
Again I drop terms unrelated to bi to get
y
0
itsu"bi  
0W0itu"bi + a0iu"bi   q0it0u"u"bi + 0Q0it0u"u"bi
+ b0i
0
u"y

its   b0i0u"Wit
  b0i0u"ai   b0i0u"u"qit + b0i0u"u"Qit + b0i0u"u"bi
  q0it 1" bi + 0Q0it 1" bi   b0i 1" qit + b0i 1" Qit + b0i 1" bi + b0i 2b bi
= b0i(
0
u"u" + 
 1
" + 
 2
b )bi
  (y0itsu" + 
0W0itu"   a0iu" + q0it0u"u"  0Q0it0u"u" + q0it 1"  0Q0it 1" )bi
  b0i(0u"yits + 0u"Wit
 + 0u"ai + 0u"u"qit   0u"u"Qit +  1" qit    1" Qit):
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Grouping terms together and adding over s and t:
b0i
 
S  T2u" + T   1" +  2b

bi
 
 
 1"
TX
t=1
(q0it  0Q0it)  u"
TX
t=1
 
SX
s=1
h
y
0
its  
0W0it   a0i   u"(q0it  0Q0it)
i!!
bi
  b0i
 
 1"
TX
t=1
(qit  Qit)  u"
TX
t=1
 
SX
s=1
[yits  Wit
  ai   u"(qit  Qit)]
!!
= b0iHbbi   bi
0
Hbbi   b0iHbbi:
Then I complete the square by adding and subtracting the term bi
0
Hbbi:
= b0iHbbi   bi
0
Hbbi   b0iHbbi + bi
0
Hbbi   bi0Hbbi
= (bi   bi)0Hb(bi   bi)  bi0Hbbi:
Since the last term is free of bi this simplies to
(bi   bi)0Hb(bi   bi):
From here it is straightforward that bi j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai;
;; u"; 2a; 2b ; " 
N
h
bi; H
 1
b
i
:
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6: The full conditional density of the parameter vector  is normally distributed as
 j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
;H
 1

i
where
H = H +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
Q0itQit
 1
" + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
Q0itQit
2
u"
 = H
 1

"
H +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
 
 1" Q
0
it(qit   bi)  u"Q0it
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"qit + u"bi)
!#
:
To show this I collect all terms from equation (23) that are related to :
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp[ :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)]
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2"
exp
 :5(qit  Qit  bi)0 1" (qit  Qit  bi)
(2) (1+Tk+L+h)=2 jHj
1
2 exp[ :5( )0H( )]:
where "it = qit  Qit  bi; so this can be written as
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp[ :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"(qit  Qit  bi))0
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"(qit  Qit  bi))]
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2"
exp
 :5(qit  Qit  bi)0 1" (qit  Qit  bi)
(2) (1+Tk+L+h)=2 jHj
1
2 exp[ :5( )0H( )]:
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Again dropping terms unrelated to ; I have
exp[ :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"(qit  Qit  bi))0
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"(qit  Qit  bi))
+ (qit  Qit  bi)0 1" (qit  Qit  bi) + ( )0H( )]:
Then I can re-write the term in the bracket as
[(yits  Wit
  ai   u"qit + u"Qit + u"bi)0 
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"qit + u"Qit + u"bi)
+(qit  Qit  bi)0 1" (qit  Qit  bi) + ( )0H( )]
= y
0
itsy

its   y
0
itsWit
  y
0
itsai   y
0
itsu"qit + y
0
itsu"Qit + y
0
itsu"bi
  
0W0ityits + 
0W0itWit
 + 
0W0itai + 
0W0itu"qit  
0W0itu"Qit
  
0W0itu"bi   a0iyits + a0iWit
 + a0iai + a0iu"qit   a0iu"Qit + a0iu"bi
  q0it0u"yits + q0it0u"Wit
 + q0it0u"ai + q0it0u"u"qit   q0it0u"u"Qit  q0it0u"u"bi
+ 0Q0it
0
u"y

its  0Q0it0u"Wit
 0Q0it0u"ai  0Q0it0u"u"qit + 0Q0it0u"u"Qit
+ 0Q0it
0
u"u"bi + b
0
i
0
u"y

its   b0i0u"Wit
  b0i0u"ai   b0i0u"u"qit + b0i0u"u"Qit
+ b0i
0
u"u"bi + q
0
it
 1
" qit   q0it 1" Qit  q0it 1" bi  0Q0it 1" qit + 0Q0it 1" Qit
+ 0Q0it
 1
" bi   b0i 1" qit + b0i 1" Qit + b0i 1" bi + 0H H 0H
+ 0H:
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Collecting terms multiplicatively related to :
y
0
itsu"Qit 
0W0itu"Qit  a0iu"Qit  q0it0u"u"Qit
+ 0Q0it
0
u"y
0
its  0Q0it0u"Wit
 0Q0it0u"ai  0Q0it0u"u"qit
+ 0Q0it
0
u"u"Qit + 
0Q0it
0
u"u"bi + b
0
i
0
u"u"Qit
  q0it 1" Qit 0Q0it 1" qit + 0Q0it 1" Qit + 0Q0it 1" bi
+ b0i
 1
" Qit + 
0H 0H 0H + 0H
= 0(H + Q
0
it
0
u"u"Qit + Q
0
it
 1
" Qit)
  (0H + q0it 1" Qit   b0i 1" Qit   y
0
itsu"Qit + 

0W0itu"Qit
+ a0iu"Qit + q
0
it
0
u"u"Qit   b0i0u"u"Qit)
  0(H + Q0it 1" qit  Q0it 1" bi  Q0it0u"yits + Q0it0u"Wit

+ Q0it
0
u"ai + Q
0
it
0
u"u"qit  Q0it0u"u"bi):
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Summing over s; i; and t, I get
0
 
H + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
Q0itQit
2
u" +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
Q0itQit
 1
"
!

 (0H +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
[ 1" Qit(q
0
it   b0i)
 u"Qit
SX
s=1
(y
0
its  
0W0it   a0i   q0itu" + b0iu")])
 0(H +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
[ 1" Q
0
it(qit   bi)  u"Q0it
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"qit + u"bi)
u"Q
0
it
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u"qit + u"bi)])
= 0H 0H 0H:
To complete the square I add and subtract 
0
H:
0H 0H 0H + 0H 0H
= ( )0H( ) 0H:
Since this last term is free of  I am left with
( )0H( ):
From here you can see that j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
; u"; 2a; 2b ; "  N

;H 1

:
7. The full conditional density of the covariance parameter u" is normally distributed
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as u" j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
u"; H
 1
u"
i
where
Hu" = Hu" + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
"0it"it
u" = H
 1
u"
"
Hu"u" +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
"0it
 
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai)
!#
:
To show this I collect all terms from equation (21) that are related to u":
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2
exp[ :5
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)]
(2) 
1
2
Hu" 12 exp[ :5(u"   u")0Hu"(u"   u")]:
Dropping any terms unrelated to u":
exp[ :5
SX
s=1
(yits Wit
 ai u""it)0(yits Wit
 ai u""it)+(u" u")0Hu"(u" u"))]:
Multiplying out the terms within the brackets:

(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it)0(yits  Wit
  ai   u""it) + (u"   u")0Hu"(u"   u")

= y
0
itsy

its   y
0
itsWit
  y
0
itsai   y
0
itsu""it  
0W0ityits + 
0W0itWit
 + 
0W0itai
+ 
0W0itu""it   a0iyits + a0iWit
 + a0iai + a0iai + a0iu""it   "0it0u"yits + "0it0u"Wit

+ "0it
0
u"ai + "
0
it
0
u"u""it + 
0
u"Hu"u"   0u"Hu"u"   0u"Hu"u" + 0u"Hu"u":
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Again dropping any terms multiplicatively unrelated to u":
  y0itsu""it + 
0W0itu""it + a0iu""it   "0it0u"yits + "0it0u"Wit

+ "0it
0
u"ai + "
0
it
0
u"u""it + 
0
u"Hu"u"   0u"Hu"u"   0u"Hu"u"
= 0u"(Hu" + "
0
it"it)u"   (0u"Hu" + y
0
its"it  
0W0it"it   a0i"it)u"
  0u"(Hu"u" + "0ityits   "0itWit
  "0itai):
Summing over s; i; and t
= 0u"
 
Hu" + S 
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
"0it"it
!
u"
 
 
0u"Hu" +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
"
"it
SX
s=1
(yits  
0W0it   a0i)
#!
u"
  0u"
 
Hu"u" +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
"
"0it
SX
s=1
(yits  Wit
  ai)
#!
= 0u"Hu"u"   
0
u"Hu"u"   0u"Hu"u":
To complete the square I add and subtract 0u"Hu"u":
0u"Hu"u"   
0
u"Hu"u"   0u"Hu"u" + 
0
u"Hu"u"   
0
u"Hu"u"
= (u"   u")0Hu"(u"   u")  0u"Hu"u":
Since this last term is free of u" I am left with
(u"   u")0Hu"(u"   u"):
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From here it is clear that u" j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; 2a; 2b ; "  N
h
u"; H
 1
u"
i
:
8. The posterior distribution of the variance parameter 2b is inverse gamma, i.e.
2b j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2a; "
 IG
24N
2
+ ab;
 
b 1b +
1
2
NX
i=1
b0ibi
! 135 :
This is derived by collecting all terms in (23) that are multiplicatively related to 2b :
NY
i=1
1p
2b
exp[ :5b0i 2b bi]
1
 (ab)b
ab
b
(2b)
 (ab+1) exp

  1
bb2b

:
Dropping terms unrelated to 2b :
 
2b
 (N
2
+ab+1) exp
"
 :5 2b
 
2b 1b +
NX
i=1
b0ibi
!#
:
From here I can see that 2b j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2a; "  IG

ab; bb

where
ab =
N
2
+ ab and bb =
"
b 1b +
1
2
NX
i=1
b0ibi
# 1
:
9. The posterior distribution of the variance parameter " is inverse gamma, i.e.
" j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2a; 2b
 IG
24NT
2
+ a" ;
 
b 1" +
1
2
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
(qit  Qit  bi)2
! 135 :
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To show this I collect all terms related to " and am left with
NY
i=1
TY
t=1
1p
2"
exp
 :5(qit  Qit  bi)0 1" (qit  Qit  bi)
1
 (a")b
a"
"
(")
 (a"+1) exp

  1
b""

:
Dropping terms unrelated to "; and simplifying I get
(")
 (NT
2
+a"+1) exp
"
 :5 1"
 
2b 1" +
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
(qit  Qit  bi)2
!#
:
Which shows that " j yit;Wit; qit;Qit; yits; ai; bi;
;; u"; 2a; 2b  IG

a" ; b"

where
a" =
NT
2
+ a" and b" =
"
b 1" +
1
2
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
(qit  Qit  bi)2
# 1
:
This concludes the MCMC algorithm.
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